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Probabilities, Planning Failures, and
Environmental Law
Dave Owen*
Environmental laws often mandate specific environmental outcomes and require
agencies to adopt plans designed to achieve those outcomes. But because of pervasive
uncettainties, agencies are often unsure if their plans will succeed Decisionmakers therefore
must decide how to balance risks ofplan failure against the costs of more cautious regulatory
approaches. Tis Article explores and evaluates legal responses to these dlemmas. Ifmd that
environmental statutes and regulations use a patchwork of measures to manage these planning
uncertainties. Decisions about planning uncertainty are fiquently made on an ad hoc,
nontiansparent basis, and plans with low success odds are common. That approach is
problematic, for it impedes public participation, increases vuinerabiity to decisionmalng
biases, and contributes to regulatory dysfunction. I therefore propose procedural and
substantive reforms designed to improve tansparency and to reduce the frequency of plan
failure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, management of the summer flounder, a
bottomfish inhabiting much of the Atlantic Coast, raised one of
environmental law's central dilemmas in particularly distilled form.
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA Fisheries) had
approved a fishing quota that agency scientists estimated had, at best,
an eighteen percent chance of preventing overfishing.' The
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Acte
explicitly directs NOAA Fisheries to prevent overfishing, so the quota
had at least an eighty-two percent chance of failing to achieve a key
statutory mandate.3 Environmental groups challenged the quota, and
the core legal question in Natual Resources Defense Council, Inc. v
Daley was whether the agency could approve an approach that might
work, but was more likely to fail.' Closely related was a second
question: if an eighteen percent chance was not good enough, but
certainty of success was not achievable unless the entire fishery was
shut down, what level of assurance would be sufficient?
Although rarely presented quite so neatly, similar questions
pervade environmental law. Environmental law is filled with standards
prescribing environmental outcomes and with planning processes
intended to achieve those outcomes.' In air and water quality
management,6 nuclear waste disposal,7 fisheries regulation, and
endangered species protection,' among many other areas,'" laws use
combinations of outcome standards and planning processes. Any
major climate change legislation will likely include similar
1. NRDC v. Daley, 209 E3d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891c (2006).
3. Daley, 209 E3d at 754.
4. The D.C. Circuit's answer was an emphatic no. Id. at 756.
5. See discussion infra Part II. Environmental law, broadly defined as including
both pollution control and natural resources law, also contains planning processes designed to
identify goals, but my focus here is on plans designed to achieve legally mandated outcomes.
6. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.E.
7. See discussion infra Part .E
8. See discussion infra Part II.A.
9. See discussion hnia Part Il.C.
10. See discussion hzt/a note 44.
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approaches." Throughout environmental management, agencies also
confront pervasive uncertainties. 2  Because of these uncertainties,
environmental agencies rarely can be certain that their plans will attain
statutory goals, unless those plans take extremely intolerant-and
therefore, in many circumstances, extremely costly-approaches
toward risks of environmental harm. 3 Using a range of analytical
tools, agencies attempt to bound those uncertainties, and they often
can estimate the probability of different outcomes."' But unless the
agency simply bans environmentally threatening activities, some
possibility of plan failure is usually unavoidable. The ubiquitous
questions therefore are how much failure risk environmental laws
should allow, who should decide, and how those decisions should be
made.
Those questions deserve attention from lawmakers. Indeed,
related questions have received enormous attention; many of
environmental law's most intense battles have addressed the setting of
standards for environmental outcomes.'5  The reasons are
straightforward: setting outcome standards implicates basic trade-offs
between levels of protection and compliance costs, and these trade-offs
are perhaps the most fundamental dilemmas of environmental law. A
similar focus on probability standards-that is, standards addressing
plans' chances of achieving mandated outcomes-would be equally
sensible, because, as Figure 1 illustrates, probability standards are
11. See discussion ihia Part II.G.
12. John S. Applegate & Robert L. Fischman, Forewor4 Missing Information: The
Scientific Data Gap in Conservation and Chemical Regulatio, 83 IND. L.J. 399, 399-400
(2008) (describing uncertainty as "one of the obstacles, if not the obstacle, that environmental
regulators must overcome in developing sensible and effective laws and policies"); Holly
Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 297 (2003)
("Uncertainty pervades every aspect of environmental law.").
Some scholars distinguish between risk, which they define as involving unknown
outcomes but known probabilities, and uncertainty, involving unknown probabilities; others
describe both situations as varieties of uncertainty. Compare, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 562, 571-72 (1992), with C.S. HOLLING ET AL., ADAPTIVE ENViRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 133-35 (1978) (using a broader definition). I use the latter
definition of uncertainty in this Article, and use risk to refer to the danger that a bad outcome
will occur.
13. SeegenerallyCass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1003 (2003) (describing the costs of strict precautionary approaches).
14. E.g., NRDC v. Daley, 209 E3d 747, 750-51 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (describing
probability estimates).
15. E.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (addressing air
quality standards); Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 E3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(addressing nuclear waste disposal standards); NRDC v. EPA, 16 E3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993)
(addressing water quality standards).
2009]
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similarly important. A lax probability standard can turn a stringent
protection standard into a perpetually unattained aspiration, lowering
short-term compliance costs but also creating persistent slippage
between legal requirements and actual performance. By contrast, a
strict probability standard will usually increase short-term compliance
costs,'6 but it also can reduce the extent of noncompliance and provide
greater environmental benefits. Probability standards therefore have





A B C D E
Regulatory Stringency and Cost
Increasing
Figure 1: Pollutant concentrations, compliance costs,
and bounded uncertainty
This figure illustrates the importance of probability standards. The solid curve shows
the mean predicted concentrations of a hypothetical pollutant as a function of
regulatory stringency. The dotted lines represent the 5th and 95th percentiles of
predicted pollutant concentrations. Points A, B, C, D, and E represent regulatory
plans of increasing stringency, with A too lenient to produce compliance, E more
stringent than necessary, and B, C, and D representing different tradeoffs between the
risk of plan failure and potential excess regulatory stringency. The regulatory limit is
a numerical limit on the tolerable environmental concentration of the pollutant. The
figure illustrates that in contexts of uncertainty, choices about the requisite odds of
16. Such short-term savings may create greater long-term costs, however. See inra
notes 342-355 and accompanying text.
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plan success can significantly influence environmental outcomes and compliance
CtS17costs.
1
Yet such attention has been sparse. While a few environmental
statutes contain signals about managing plan uncertainty, those signals
are often vague or indirect, leaving agencies with minimal guidance
and significant amounts of discretion. 8 Congress has an amply
documented track record of underestimating or ignoring
environmental uncertainties, 9 so that inattention is not entirely
surprising. But administrative agencies, though theoretically more
informed about the uncertainties they must confront, have made few
systematic efforts to fill the legislative void. ° Rarely have agencies
promulgated generally applicable rules setting standards for the
probability of plan success.2' Nonbinding guidance, though slightly
more abundant, has little visibility and often leaves major issues
unresolved." Agency personnel unavoidably address these issues as
they develop and approve plans, but they often do so without much
evidence of deliberation. 3 Judicial discussions, while present and even
somewhat robust in a few legal contexts, are entirely absent elsewhere,
even in circumstances in which planning uncertainty could be a central
litigation issue." Uncertainty management may seem a technically
daunting and politically unappealing topic,25 and some gap between the
17. The neatness of the curve and the precise prediction of regulatory costs are both
unrealistic-though necessary for graphical simplicity-but otherwise Figure 1 depicts
common relationships and circumstances. Predictions about plan effectiveness are often
uncertain, and efforts to improve environmental outcomes often create exponentially
increasing compliance costs.
18. See discussion infia Part II.
19. See Wendy E. Wagner, Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 181, 184.
20. See discussion h/iia Part II.
21. See discussion infia Part II.
22. See discussion infia Part II.
23. See, e.g., discussion /nfa Part II.B (discussing decisions to approve or reject state
implementation plans).
24. See, e.g., infia notes 117-124 and accompanying text (discussing Envtl. Def. v.
EPA, 369 E3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004)).
25. An example from another context illustrates political figures' reluctance to
acknowledge uncertainty. In early 2009, President Obama repeatedly touted the job-creating
potential of his recovery plans, often offering quantified predictions with no acknowledgment
of potential error. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House, American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act: State-by-State Jobs Impact (Feb. 13, 2009). These were highly uncertain
predictions, of course, and the White House knew it, but the false precision reflected political
demands for an appearance of confidence.
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importance of the issue and the frequency of its discussion therefore
should not be surprising.26 But this gap has been exceedingly large.
Scholarly attention also has been limited. Environmental law
scholars often debate the proper balance of protection levels and
compliance costs, and the methodologies through which those
balances should be set. 7 Environmental law scholars also have spent
years exploring why actual outcomes so often fall short of legislative
mandates. 28  Finally, particularly in the past two decades, many
academics have examined the legal implications of environmental
instability and uncertainty. 29  Problems of planning uncertainty lie at
the intersection of all of these inquiries. But only a few studies address
the approaches of particular statutes or agencies to uncertainties about
plan success." While the extensive precautionary principle literature
confronts related subjects, it provides little useful guidance on
questions of planning uncertainty.3' The adaptive management
26. See Wagner, supra note 19, at 221-57 (explaining why Congress ignores the
limitations of scientific knowledge).
27. Much of the voluminous debate about cost-benefit analysis, for example,
addresses methodologies for determining outcome standards. See generally Thomas 0.
McGarity, Professor Sunstein FuzzyMath, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341 (2002) (discussing the process
of creating drinking water standards for arsenic and critiquing Professor Sunstein's
methodologies); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255 (2002)
(discussing the process of creating drinking water standards for arsenic).
28. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seiously: Noncompliance and
Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARv. ENvnL. L. REv. 297, 301-03, 320-22
(1999).
29. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENvIRoNMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35-36 (1999); Mary Jane Angelo,
Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law. Why We Shoul4 Why We Don't,
andHow We Can, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1527, 1531 (2008) ("One of the biggest challenges of the
legal system is to be able to address the uncertainty inherent in science."); A. Dan Tarlock,
The Nonequilibrium Parahgrn in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law,
27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122-23 (1994). See generaily Jonathan Baert Wiener, Law and
the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325 (1995).
These sources represent the tip of an iceberg, and the nonlegal literature addressing
environmental uncertainty is even more extensive.
30. See, e.g., Josh Eagle & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Answering Lord Peryb
Question: Dissecting Regulatory Overfishing, 46 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 649, 653-76,
(2003); James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy- Conflicts Between
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 933-34
(2005) (discussing the Clean Air Act's approach to planning uncertainty); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENVTL. L. 569 (1990)
(exploring judicial tolerance for mitigation measures with uncertain prospects of success);
Kevin Cassidy, Comment, Endangered Species'Sippeiy Slope Back to the States. Existing
Regudatory Mechanisms and Ongoing Conservation Efforts Under the Endangered Species
Act 32 ENVTL. L. 175 (2002) (discussing reliance on state conservation plans).
31. A strong precautionary principle might resolve this dilemma by requiring plans to
either create certainty of success or ban environmentally threatening activities. See Sunstein,
270 [Vol. 84:265
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literature necessarily confronts issues of planning failure, as that
literature begins with the observation that our predictive capacities are
limited and that failures therefore are inevitable. 2 But legal-academic
proponents of adaptive management typically prescribe monitoring
and adjustment systems designed to change course as problems
emerge, and say little--or are overtly skeptical-about attempted
reforms designed to improve ex ante decisionmaking." This Article
therefore addresses a question that, while basic, remains largely
unexplored: what assurance of success should environmental plans
provide?
In Part II, I begin that analysis by exploring existing legislative
and administrative approaches to planning uncertainty within some of
the most important areas of environmental regulation. That analysis
demonstrates the pervasiveness of these issues; across multiple areas
of environmental policy, uncertainties about plan effectiveness recur,
usually with significant consequences. While approaches vary, several
themes emerge. As discussed above, neither legislation nor
generalized rulemaking processes have done much to address these
uncertainties. In the absence of such systematic attention from
lawmakers, agency staff members often address questions of plan
uncertainty on an ad hoc basis, sometimes with little transparency.
When agencies do directly confront these issues, or when the courts
intervene, the common consequence still is a preference for plans
thought to have only slightly better than even odds of success.
Problems of planning uncertainty have not been entirely ignored. In
most contexts, some combination of statutes, regulatory guidance, and
judicial decisions has provided at least a little legal direction, and I
found no clear evidence that agencies are now systematically and
intentionally approving plans as risky as the summer flounder quota at
Precautionary Pinciple, supm note 13, at 1011-16 (describing versions of the principle).
That approach would not work in many contexts, however, because of trade-offs among
competing environmental goals or because a total prohibition is not appropriate or politically
acceptable. See id. at 1004. A more moderate precautionary principle, which holds that in
conditions of uncertainty we should err in the direction that avoids irreversible environmental
damage, is more workable and provides a basis for agencies to do more than just adopt the
least stringent plan that might succeed, but otherwise provides only very general guidance
about how much certainty plans should provide.
32. See generally HOLLING ET AL., supra note 12; KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND
GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITCS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1993).
33. See discussion infra Part IInC (discussing adaptive management literature).
2009]
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issue in Daley.34 But the patchwork of present approaches has not
produced a transparent system, or a system more than mildly averse to
risks of plan failure.
In Part III, I explain why these conclusions are cause for concern.
Resolving this issue on an ad hoc, nontransparent basis impedes
participation and accountability, both of which our governance system
appropriately values.35 That approach also undermines evaluations of
agency performance; without probability standards, it can be difficult
to discern whether plan failures result from appropriate policy choices
or flawed decisionmaking approaches. Ad hoc resolution of
uncertainty questions also likely exacerbates the effects of heuristic
biases, free riding, and other sorts of agency behaviors likely to
increase gaps between congressionally mandated environmental goals
and actual outcomes.36 Similarly, even a moderately high tolerance for
risk assures that many plans will fail, leading not only to slippage but
also to the frequent and costly need to adapt existing plans or to
develop new ones.37 Whether one supports the full achievement of
environmental statutes' goals or considers those goals to be excessively
ambitious, the expense, contentiousness, and regulatory uncertainty
created by repeated plan revisions are all good reasons to want plans
with a high likelihood of fulfilling statutory mandates. And where
correcting a failed plan is not possible, failure can lead to irreversible
and ostensibly illegal environmental harm.
I therefore propose both procedural and substantive reforms. To
improve procedure, lawmakers should create specific and generally
applicable standards for the probability of plan success. In theory,
those standards could come from Congress, though it probably is
unrealistic to expect legislators to candidly acknowledge the reality
that their prescribed planning approaches will not always work out.
More realistically, agencies should build on congressional signals, or
fill the voids where they are absent, by promulgating rules for
managing uncertainties about the effectiveness of plans. On substance,
those rules should both require uncertainty discussions and set
maximum levels of tolerable failure risk,38 and thus should move
34. This Article does not demonstrate that such systematically permissive approaches
are not occurring. I simply did not find strong, current, and uncontroverted evidence in the
areas I reviewed.
35. See discussion lhfra Part II.A.
36. See discussion hnfm Part llI.A.
37. See discussion /ifia Part III.B.
38. In most circumstances, meaningful standards are likely to be qualitative, for the
kind of quantitative precision described in Daley is rarely possible. Qualitative uncertainty
272 [Vol. 84:265
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agencies away from the presently common practice of ad hoc and
opaque plan uncertainty management. Those standards should not
demand exact quantification of failure odds; because of the
uncertainties surrounding environmental predictions, precise
quantification of success probabilities is often impossible.39 Those
standards usually also should not strive to eliminate all plan failure, for
in an uncertain world, that goal also is often unrealistic.4" But the
standards should demand at least qualitative estimates of the likelihood
of failure, and they should attempt to reduce the frequency with which
failures occur.
These reforms are likely to create incremental improvements
rather than wholesale change. They would not eliminate the
importance of a long-running debate about whether planning-based
approaches should enjoy such prominence in environmental law, or
whether they should be more extensively displaced by technology-
based regulation or some alternative system." When agencies respond
to probability standards, as they sometimes will, by producing more
optimistic predictions rather than by adopting more cautious plans, the
standards will produce slight change, at most.42 Similarly, where data
are thin and environmental systems poorly understood, probabilities
are likely to be uncertain, and assertions of compliance with
probability standards will be educated estimates. Consequently, while
these reforms should reduce decisional error, they will not eliminate it,
standards can still guide decisionmakers, however, as legal standards like "beyond a
reasonable doubt" demonstrate.
39. Agencies often do produce quantitative predictions and quantitative error
analyses, and if decisionmakers understand that those numbers are not precise and accurate
predictions, there is nothing wrong with using those predictions to inform regulatory choices.
40. The exception, of course, occurs if plan failure would have catastrophic or serious
and irreversible effects. Then, certainty, or something very close to it, is a reasonable goal.
41. The promoters of planning-based approaches typically cite their potential to tailor
regulatory intensity to desired outcomes, avoiding overregulation or underregulation. See,
e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1333, 1334-40 (1985); William E Pedersen, Jr., Turaing the Tide on Water Quality, 15
ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 87-89 (1988). Skeptics argue that challenges of creating individualized
regulatory regimes for each planning area are enormous, and contend that the primary
alternative, technology-based standards, is much more feasible, though by no means perfect.
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T The Convergent Evolution of
Environmental Law, 63 MIss. L.J. 403, 410-28 (1994); Wendy E. Wagner, The Tiumph of
Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83.
42. This already happens sometimes, and would likely happen more if probability
standards create an incentive to produce optimistic predictions. See, e.g., Fine & Owen,
supra note 30, at 956-57. But the professional norms of agency scientists are likely to create
some resistance to such changes, particularly where the new assumptions seem less credible.
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and other corrective measures will remain essential.4 '3  But these
reforms would contribute to more coherent environmental planning
processes, in which somewhat more deliberative dialogues address the
possibility of plan failure, and in which gaps between desired and
actual environmental outcomes are somewhat smaller. In a field in
which dramatic reform has proven elusive, such incremental
improvements are well worth pursuing.
II. EXISTING APPROACHES
If the dilemma presented in Daley was unique to fisheries
management, it would be an obscure sideshow to the main body of
environmental law. But that dilemma recurs, often barely noticed,
throughout environmental law. This Part provides a detailed
exploration of some of the key contexts in which planning
uncertainties arise. I begin with fisheries regulation, which has
presented these questions particularly starkly I then focus on several
of the most consequential areas of environmental policy-air quality,
biodiversity protection, environmental impact assessment, and water
quality. I also consider nuclear waste policy, which, while arguably
less important, presents an interesting example of a different approach.
I close by considering climate change, which is likely to present a new
set of planning uncertainty challenges. The discussion is not
comprehensive; these questions emerge in too many contexts for one
article to address all.' But the survey illustrates the range of typical
approaches and amply demonstrates that the issue is very important.
The survey is also striking in what it does not find. While few
categorical statements are possible, there is a paucity of strict,
generally applicable standards enacted through legislation or
rulemaking. Some statutes provide very general direction, but
Congress has never enacted a law with clear and risk-averse guidance
on probability standards, which standards the implementing agency
then fleshed out through consistent, generally applicable regulations.
In other words, environmental law never has addressed these questions
the way our administrative law system is often assumed to approach
43. In Part IHl.C, I consider the relationship between the reforms I propose and
theories of adaptive management. Despite possible superficial appearances of contradiction,
I see the approaches as compatible.
44. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1235 (2006) (setting forth requirements for abandoned
mine reclamation plans); Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rancho
Cordova, 150 P.3d 709 (Cal. 2007) (evaluating water supply planning).
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important issues. 5 Nor is there much evidence that an alternative "new
governance" model, in which local governments and stakeholders
debate these issues and arrive at solutions tailored to local
circumstances, has emerged or is likely to do so. Congressional
direction, to the extent it exists, usually provides little constraint.
Agencies have adopted ad hoc approaches, often with little debate, or,
in rare cases, have followed rules imposed by the courts." That does
not mean the issue has been ignored; in most areas, some combination
of vague statutory directives, judicial decisions, and agency policy
guidance has created at least some direction, and some of the resulting
constraints appear to have affected outcomes. 7 Moreover, even where
legal guidance is minimal, the professional culture of agency staff
sometimes dampens willingness to adopt plans with extremely low
success odds. 8 But problems of opacity and tolerance for plans with
moderately low success odds often remain.
A. Fisheries
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act)49 is the nation's primary regulatory
statute for saltwater and anadromous fisheries. It seeks to limit foreign
fishing boats' access to American waters, to provide economic
protection and stability to fishermen and their communities, and to
prevent overfishing. ° Overfishing, according to the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, exceeds the "optimum yield" at which the fishery will be
both sustainable and maximally productive."
To implement its anti-overfishing mandate, the Magnuson-
Stevens Act relies on a planning-based system. Using research
produced by NOAA Fisheries 2 and an ample dose of discretionary
judgment, regional fishery management councils develop fishery
45. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
360-61 (7th ed. 2006).
46. For advocacy of this model, see Michael C. Dorf & Charles E Sabel, A
Constitution ofDemocraic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 286-88 (1998).
47. See, e.g., mnfia notes 72-74, 175-190 and accompanying text.
48. See discussion nfia Part II.B (describing interviews with EPA air quality staff).
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1891c (2006).
50. Id
51. Id. § 1851(a)(1).
52. See Eagle & Thompson, supra note 30, at 655 (describing research by NOAA's
Fisheries Science Centers).
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management plans and annual fishing quotas.53 They also allocate
those quotas among groups of fishers and select regulatory measures
designed to ensure that the quotas are not exceeded.54 The councils
submit their plans and quotas to NOAA Fisheries, and as long as the
plans and quotas are consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
NOAA Fisheries must approve them. Unlike many pollution control
statutes, which rely on overlapping planning and technology-based
controls, no complementary set of feasibility-driven standards provides
backup, and fishery management depends primarily upon this
planning-based approach. 6
Throughout their planning, the management councils and NOAA
Fisheries must contend with uncertainties. Even without human
influence, many fish populations would vary stochastically, leaving
year-to-year populations unpredictable and potentially obscuring long-
term trends. 7 Available data are often scant or of suspect quality,
compromising the validity of estimates of species' status.
Animosities between agency scientists and fishers exacerbate
uncertainties by impeding information flow.59  The effectiveness of
regulatory measures is often unpredictable. Fishers have significant
incentives to maximize their catch, and they often catch more than
53. The plan itself may set the quota, or the quotas may be set through annual
decisions. In Daley, the latter approach was at issue. NRDC v. Daley, 209 E3d 747, 750
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
54. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h), 1853.
55. See JOSH EAGLE ET AL., TAKING STOCK OF THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT
COUNCILS 1, 11 (2004) ("NMFS generally has not attempted to override the decisions of the
councils."); Scott C. Matulich et al., Policy Formulation Versus Policy Implementation Under
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Insight from the North
Pacific Crab Rationalization, 34 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 241 (2007) ("NMFS has no
authority to revise a council-submitted FMP, amendment, or proposed regulation to suit its
own policy preferences....").
56. See, e.g., Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 E3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing
the Clean Water Act's reliance on complementary technology-based and planning-based
regulatory approaches).
57. See OCEAN STUDIES BD., DIv. ON EARTH & LIFE STUDIES, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN THE NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE 16 (2002)
(describing uncertainties).
58. See EAGLE ET AL., supra note 55, at 16-19; Eagle & Thompson, supra note 30, at
653-76.
59. Scientists depend upon fishers for data, but fishers are sometimes reluctant to
provide information, and agency scientists are often reluctant to credit the anecdotal and
unquantified information fishers can provide. See Ilene M. Kaplan & Bonnie J. McCay,
Cooperative Research, Co-Management and the Social Dimension of Fisheries Science and
Management, 28 MARINE POL'Y 257, 257-58 (2004) (noting "adversarial relations and
tensions... between the government sector and fishing community"); Alec Wilkinson, The
Lobsterman, NEWYORKER, July 31, 2006, at 58-59.
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regulators ostensibly intended to allow.' Agency staff reviewing
proposed fishery management plans or quotas therefore can hardly
ever provide absolute assurance that a plan will work.'
Despite those pervasive uncertainties, the Magnuson-Stevens Act
provides limited guidance on the level of assurance that planning
decisions must provide. The Magnuson-Stevens Act clearly states that
ending overfishing is an overall statutory mandate.62 But the Act
provides no prescription for the requisite level of certainty for each
plan." While NOAA Fisheries' regulations sometimes require that
plans "assure" achievement of the statutory goal,' "assure" is not a
precise term, and the agency has never promulgated any sort of
generalized regulation or even nonbinding guidance defining a more
precise meaning. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit explained in Fishermen's Dock Cooperave, Inc. v Brown,65
the regulations simply "do not say what probability of success ...
constitutes 'assurance' of success."6 In the absence of such guidance,
60. See EAGLE ETAL., supra note 55, at 15 (describing causes of"overages").
61. Id. at 14. The authors explain:
NOAA scientists ... almost always present the councils with a range of possible
MSYs. For example, scientists might tell a council that there is an 80 percent
chance that the MSY is between 10 and 25 million pounds annually. This spread
provides a council with a large amount of discretion. The council may choose to
"set" the MSY of the fishery at any level between 10 million and 25 million
pounds.
Id.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6) (2006); NRDC v. Daley, 209 E3d 747, 749 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (describing the Act's structure).
63. Even since 2007, when Congress tightened deadlines for ending overfishing and
required catch limits within the range recommended by scientific and technical advisory
bodies, the Act has imposed only a minimal limitation. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(6). Those
limitations should preclude decisions by the FMCs to set catch levels higher than the highest
level suggested by fisheries' scientists, but they will not independently prevent decisions to
set the limit within, but near, the upper end of the range. See Eagle & Thompson, supra note
30, at 660 (describing "strong" and "weak decision overfishing"). One might argue that
deadlines indicate the need for a fairly high level of certainty. The Clean Air Act, however,
contains similar deadlines, and the EPA still often approves plans thought to have near even
failure odds. See discussion !i-f Part II.B.
64. E.g., Daley, 209 E3d at 750.
65. 75 E3d 164, 172 (4th Cir. 1996). In Fisherman Dock Cooperative, a fishing
group argued that the plan provided too much assurance of success in preventing overfishing,
rather than, as in Daley, too little. The Fourth Circuit rejected that argument. See id.; see also
Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense Natural Resource Management in the Bush
Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 299-301 (2005) (discussing Fishermen's Dock
Cooperative).
66. Fishenmen Dock Coop., 75 E3d at 172; see Daley, 209 E3d at 752 ("[T]he trial
court found that the Fishery Act expressed no clear intent as to the particular level of certainty
a TAL must guarantee .... ").
TULANE LA WREVIEW
"the choice of how much assurance to indulge in must be a policy
choice left to the reasonable exercise of the discretion of the statutorily
authorized decision-makers," and those decisionmakers traditionally
made their choices on an ad hoc basis. 7
That ad hoc approach has done little to promote sustainable
fishery management. The risky choice at issue in Daley was not
atypical: according to Eagle et al., "rather than choosing a quota in the
middle of the recommended range, the councils almost always chose
quotas that were at or near the top of the range, making effective
management unlikely."68  NOAA Fisheries generally acquiesces to
those choices; the same authors found that, "during the study period
... [NOAA Fisheries] disapproved at best 0.4 percent of the individual
management measures submitted by the councils.""' The results were
predictable and have been widely lamented: despite decades of
regulation, overfishing remains pervasive." The consequences of that
overfishing have sometimes been devastating.7'
Nevertheless, after Daley, fishery managers no longer have quite
as much flexibility to select approaches acknowledged to have low
odds of preventing overfishing. "Only in Superman Comics' Bizarro
world," the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held, "where reality is turned upside down, could the Service
reasonably conclude that a measure that is at least four times as likely
to fail as to succeed offers a 'fairly high level of confidence.' 72 The
court also explained what it considered to be a minimum standard: "at
the very least ... 'to assure' the achievement of the target [mortality
rate], to 'prevent overfishing,' and to 'be consistent with' the fishery
management plan, the [overall fishing quota] must have had at least a
50% chance of attaining [the target mortality rate]." 3 NOAA Fisheries
and lower courts have since treated that fifty percent mark as
67. Fishermen Dock Coop., 75 E3d at 172.
68. EAGLE ET AL., supm note 55, at 1, 15 ("[C]ouncils face significant pressure to
increase the size of fishery quotas and thus the amount of fishing rights that can be
apportioned."); see Eagle & Thompson, supra note 30, at 656-63 (describing management of
the Gulf Coast king mackerel fishery).
69. EAGLE ET AL., supra note 55, at 32.
70. Id. at 4.
71. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Managemeni 81 MiNN. L. RE. 869, 946-47 (1997) (describing the crash in Atlantic cod
populations and the enormous resulting losses in jobs and income).
72. NRDC v. Daley, 209 E3d 747, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The "fairly high level of
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necessary, and sufficient, for a plan to meet the statutory goals.4
Daleythus did raise the bar, albeit not particularly high.
This story contains several notable features, many of which turn
out to be typical. First, responses to planning uncertainty are crucial to
the effectiveness of the regulatory program. Second, Congress
provided only general guidance about how much assurance of success
fishery management plans should provide. Nor did NOAA Fisheries
ever fill the void by promulgating general rules. Nothing in agency
rules explicitly stated that an eighteen percent chance of success was
not good enough, and in practice, the agency routinely acquiesced to
such low odds of success. Creating a generally applicable standard
therefore fell to the courts. The resulting standard does appear to have
triggered a slight shift toward less risky plans, removed some risky
proposals from the scope of debate, and provided conservation groups
a litigation hook to challenge plans that arguably are unlikely to
succeed. It suggests, in short, that a probability standard can change
outcomes. But the improvement is a halting one. If the Daley
standard is consistently applied, almost half of the nation's fishery
management plans still could turn out to be failures.76  The many
adverse consequences of plan failure, including unsustainable
74. See, e.g., Coastal Conservation Ass'n v. Gutierrez, 512 F Supp. 2d 896, 900 (S.D.
Tex. 2007) (rejecting a plan that would not meet the fifty percent threshold); Oceana, Inc. v.
Evans, No. Civ.A.04-081 1 (ESH), 2005 WL 555416, at *16 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005) (treating
fifty percent as the threshold); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, No.Civ.A.99-1707 (RWR),
2003 WL 23147552, at *3, 5 (D.D.C. July 3, 2003); Fisheries of the Northeastern United
States; Atlantic Bluefish Fisheries; 2006 Atlantic Bluefish Specifications; Quota Adjustment;
2006 Research Set-Aside Project, 71 Fed. Reg. 9471, 9474 (Feb. 24, 2006) (codified as
amended at 50 C.ER. pt. 648) (eliminating an alternative because it would not reach the fifty
percent threshold) (treating fifty percent as the threshold); see also N.C. Fisheries Ass'n v.
Evans, 152 E Supp. 2d 870, 872 (E.D. Va. 2001) (allowing quota adjustments to be made to
ensure the fifty percent threshold is met); Recreational Fishing Alliance v. Evans, 172 E
Supp. 2d 35, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2001) (treating fifty percent as the threshold).
75. See sources cited supm note 74. The other possibility is that the standard has
encouraged NOAA scientists to select models and assumptions that will make more
optimistic predictions, ultimately producing no change in results. E-mail from Josh Eagle to
author (Feb. 26, 2009) (on file with author). That is a difficult hypothesis to verify or falsify.
But it seems plausible, based on the actions of agency staff in other contexts, to expect that
scientists will sometimes, but not always, make those shifts, meaning that the probability
standard will sometimes, but not always, change outcomes. See discussion hfra Part H.C
(describing Endangered Species Act implementation).
76. Josh Eagle, Regional Ocean Governance.- The Penis of Multiple-Use
Management and the Promise ofAgency Diversity, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y E 143, 159
(2006) (noting that the standard "still left the success of U.S. fisheries management to a
slightly weighted coin toss").
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overfishing, regulatory conflict, and potentially catastrophic economic
risk to fishing communities, all likely would remain common.77
B. Air Quality
While systematic efforts to address plan uncertainty have been
weak in fishery management, they have been even rarer and less
visible for air quality planning. That is not because the issue is
unimportant. Because Clean Air Act (CAA) implementation produces
enormous costs and benefits, because the CAA places central
importance on planning, and because air quality managers confront
substantial uncertainties, the stakes are high."8 But neither Congress
nor the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has provided a legal
framework for deciding what success odds a plan should create, and in
the absence of such a framework, agency discussions of uncertainty
management are often minimal, opaque, and functionally
nonreviewable. Agency modelers and planners do address these
questions-rigorously and carefully, in their view-and some EPA
offices are confident that their approaches are effective. 9  The
statutory and regulatory structure also contains measures to
compensate for plan failures." But key decisions about plan
uncertainty nevertheless have tended to occur with little transparency
or public oversight, often with poor results."
The CAA relies heavily on a planning-based approach. It
requires the EPA to develop numeric standards, known as "national
ambient air quality standards" (NAAQS), for air pollutants that "may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."82
77. For a discussion of those consequences, see EAGLE ET AL., supm note 55, at 19,
describing a complete closure of the Pacific rockfish fishery, and Houck, supra note 71, at
946-47.
78. See EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990 TO 2010 iii
(1999).
79. I base this assertion on interviews with staff members in the EPA's regional
offices.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(9) (2006) (outlining contingency measures). The EPA
also requires new plans if existing plans fail to produce attainment.
81. See Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 938-70 (chronicling the failure of one SIP);
Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Admimstative Incentives, and the New Clean AirAct 21
ENVTL. L. 1647, 1683-84, 1688 (1991) (identifying SIP deficiencies in air pollution
regulation); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Ai- Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans-
Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 357-58 (2004)
(dismissing the SIP program as a "failure," largely because many areas remain in
nonattainment).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409. Those standards are to "allow[] an adequate margin of
safety." Id. § 7409(b)(1). According to the EPA, "In selecting primary standards that provide
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States with areas not in compliance with the NAAQS must develop
"state implementation plans" (SIP) specifying the regulatory control
measures the state will use to "attain" compliance.83 Each SIP or SIP
revision must be submitted to the EPA for approval, along with a
computer-model-based demonstration that the plan will produce
attainment." The EPA must approve or reject each submission. 5 If
approved, SIPs create legal obligations, enforceable by state or federal
regulatory authorities or by private parties.86 They also constrain future
activities and planning. Transportation development must be
consistent with a lawful SIP, and before approving any project in a
nonattainment area, federal agencies and "metropolitan planning
organization(s)" must demonstrate that the project will "conform" to
the SIP and will not create or contribute to nonattainment SIPs are
not the CAA's exclusive mechanism for improving air quality; fuel
standards, technology-based standards, and a variety of other controls
all should complement planning. But planning theoretically should
serve as a backstop and a unifying approach.
As with fishery management, air quality management is filled
with uncertainties, and agencies are often unsure whether their plans
will succeed. Some air pollutants-particularly ozone, which causes
some of the most pervasive pollution problems--derive from complex
chemical reactions, and pollutant levels do not respond linearly to
an adequate margin of safety, the Administrator is seeking not only to prevent pollution levels
that have been demonstrated to be harmful but also to prevent lower pollutant levels that may
pose an unacceptable risk of harm." National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73
Fed. Reg. 16,436, 16,437 (Mar. 27, 2008) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 56-58). The
margin of safety in the NAAQS thus serves to ensure that air quality is better than currently
thought necessary, not to accommodate planning error.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7410. The Act also requires states to plan for maintaining air quality
in areas in compliance with the NAAQS. See id. §§ 7471, 7473.
84. Eg., id § 751 l(c)(2)(A).
85. If a state does not submit a plan, or submits an inadequate plan, the EPA must
prepare a substitute "Federal Implementation Plan." Id. § 7410(c). The EPA generally strives
to avoid this step. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Missing Milestones: A Critical Look at the
Clean AirAct VOC Emissions Reduction Program in NonattainmentAreas, 18 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 41,49 (1999) (describing the "vanishingly small" odds of FIP preparation).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
87. Id. § 7506(c); see Envtl. Def., Inc. v. EPA, 509 E3d 553, 555-57 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(describing the relationships between SIPs and conformity).
88. See Houck, supra note 41, at 418-22 (describing the CAA's increasing emphasis
on complementary approaches).
89. See EPA, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF MODELS AND OTHER ANALYSES FOR
DEMONSTRATING ATTAINMENT OF AIR QUALITY GOALS FOR OZONE, PM2.5, AND REGIONAL
HAZE 12 (2007) ("There is uncertainty accompanying model predictions.").
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changes in source emissions.' Shifting weather also introduces
variability; wind and heat both affect locations and concentrations of
air pollutants, and neither is entirely predictable.' Economic
fluctuations may affect energy consumption and thus fossil fuel
combustion, unforeseen market trends or development patterns may
change automotive or industrial emissions, and the enforceability of
emissions control rules is often unpredictable.92 That does not mean
planning is pure guesswork. State and federal air agencies have spent
years improving their predictive techniques, and EPA employees are
confident in some of their models' predictions.93 But attainment
demonstrations still often contain layers of uncertainties.
Words sprinkled through the CAA provide general guidance
about managing this uncertainty. For example, "[e]ach State shall have
the primary responsibility for assuring air quality" throughout the
state; SIPs "will specify the manner in which national primary and
secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved and
maintained;9" and each SIP "shall provide for attainment of the
national primary ambient air quality standards." '95 The CAA also
requires specific enforceability and monitoring measures to help
ensure that attainment actually occurs.96 Those statutory provisions
suggest that the CAA probably would not allow the kind of risk
tolerance that once was routine in fisheries planning. 7
Nevertheless, some ambiguity remains. Nowhere does the CAA
expressly state a probability standard. Congress, if it understood the
uncertainties inherent in air quality planning, probably would not
demand certainty that a SIP would produce attainment, for such
certainty might come only with extremely high compliance costs.
Indeed, several sections of the CAA contemplate plan failure. For
example, sections 7509 and 7511 specify consequences, including
90. New York v. EPA, 133 E3d 987, 984-90 (7th Cir. 1998); McGarity, supra note 85,
at 50 (describing "huge uncertainties" about ozone formation). EPA staff told me they were
confident in their ability to model concentrations of directly emitted pollutants, but that ozone
and particulate matter, which derive largely from precursor emissions, remain challenging.
91. See Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 914, 944-45 (describing mechanisms of
ozone creation).
92. See id at 960; Reitze, supra note 81, at 361.
93. E.g., Telephone Interview with Christos Panos, Envtl. Eng'r, EPA Region 5 (Sept.
30, 2008) (describing some of EPA's models as "very, very accurate"); Telephone Interview
with Marcia Spink, Assoc. Dir., Office of Air Programs, EPA Region 3 (Oct. 10, 2008)
("When we pop every grid cell green, that SIP works.").
94. 42 U.S.C. § 7407 (2000) (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 7502(c) (emphasis added).
96. Id. §§ 7410(a), 7410(m), 7502(c)(6), 7509.
97. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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redesignation as a more severe classification of nonattainment area, if
attainment deadlines are missed.98 Those provisions would seem
unnecessary had Congress anticipated that initial attainment
predictions would certainly be correct." The EPA therefore could
reasonably argue that the CAA is not so clear as to eliminate the EPA's
discretion to decide how much certainty is enough.
While Congress may have left this question unresolved, it cannot
have escaped the attention of the EPA or of state air quality planners.
Those state planners have developed, and the EPA has approved,
dozens of SIPs and SIP amendments, and many agency staff members
devote their careers to building and improving simulation models
designed to manage uncertainties.'" Those state and federal planners
have produced successes,' °' but also have witnessed the demise of
many plans; failures in areas like Los Angeles, Houston, or the San
Joaquin Valley indicate that attainment demonstrations are sometimes
highly uncertain.' 2 The EPA and the state planners also are well aware
of the enormous effort that each SIP update requires, and know that
while SIPs can be revised, plan failure is well worth avoiding.' 3 The
EPA therefore has sufficient experience and ample incentive to
generate a consistent and cautious approach to uncertainty manage-
ment.
Nevertheless, the EPA's attempts to create consistent approaches
have been tentative and have encouraged plans with significant failure
risk. The agency has never promulgated generally applicable
regulations specifying what probability standard a SIP must satisfy. Its
primary guidance document on approving SIPs does not even address
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7509, 7511.
99. In the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress attempted to bolster the overall
planning scheme by requiring states to submit plans for achieving incremental progress
toward the overall goal. Compliance with that requirement has been poor, but its existence
also suggests that Congress perceived a need for insurance against plan failure. See
McGarity, supra note 85, at 89-90, 97.
100. Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 904 n.9; see, e.g., EPA, supra note 89 (prescribing
approaches to uncertainty management).
101. Despite academic literature criticizing the SIP approach, see sources cited supra
note 81 and accompanying text, the EPA employees I spoke with generally thought the
approach worked reasonably well, and most cited specific success stories.
102. See McGarity, supra note 85, at 46-48. Commentators have argued that historic
SIP approvals were premised on dubious rationales. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Goals
Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act 30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 771-74
(1983) ("EPA bent over backwards to approve whatever plans the states submitted.").
103. See EPA, supra note 89, at 4 ("Resource intensive approaches may often be
needed to support an adequate attainment demonstration."); Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at
950-58 (describing one amendment to a portion of California's ozone SIP).
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the question.'" The agency's only centralized effort to address the
issue of plan uncertainty comes from a series of nonbinding modeling
guidance documents, and those documents fall well short of clearly
endorsing a risk-averse approach.' 5 Under the EPA's current guidance,
a model that, with a weight-of-evidence adjustment, predicts design
values' 6 just barely below, or even equal to,' 7 the NAAQS still has
demonstrated attainment.' 8 In other words, a model that predicts
compliance only by a hair's breadth has shown attainment, and a SIP
with no margin of error should be approved.
That recommendation is interesting on several levels. First, as
nonbinding guidance, it allows alternative approaches, and the EPA's
emphasis on utilizing weight-of-evidence techniques heightens the
104. State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for the Implementation of Title I
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,498 (Apr. 16, 1992) (codified as
amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 52).
105. In its original guidance, the EPA encouraged its modelers to convey information
about uncertainties and tentatively suggested reliance upon a best estimate. Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 58 Fed. Reg. 38,816, 38,841
(July 20, 1993) (codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pts. 51-52, 260, 266). The EPA asserted
that "it is unclear how this information should be used to make an air pollution control
decision" but then added that "it is easiest and tends to ensure consistency if the decision-
maker confines his judgment to use of the 'best estimate' provided by the modeler." Id A
few paragraphs later, the EPA qualified that suggestion by stating that "[n]o specific guidance
on the consideration of model uncertainty in decision-making is being given at this time." Id
For years, and through multiple updates, that language remained unchanged. E.g.,
Revision to the Guideline on Air Quality Models: Adoption of a Preferred General Purpose
(Flat and Complex Terrain) Dispersion Model and Other Revisions, 70 Fed. Reg. 68,218,
68,24647 (Nov. 9, 2005) (codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 51); Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 61 Fed. Reg. 41,838-41,
41,858-59 (Aug. 12, 1996) (codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pts. 51-52). In 2007, the EPA
issued additional guidance with new wording but a similar underlying approach. See
generally EPA, supra note 89. The EPA again recommended reliance on the best estimate,
supplemented by a weight-of-the-evidence check, but did not purport to bind its
decisionmakers. See id at 17-19.
106. The Clean Air Act allows three exceedances of the NAAQS over the course of a
compliance period. 42 U.S.C. § 7511 (2006). For that reason, modelers focus on the fourth-
highest value predicted by the model.
107. The EPA also rounds off its results, so it considers a prediction of a 0.084 ppm
concentration to constitute an attainment demonstration for a 0.080 ppm standard. EPA,
supra note 89, at 40.
108. Id at 40, 44; see also Telephone Interview with Lynorae Benjamin, EPA, Region
4 (Nov. 21, 2008); Telephone Interview with Doris Lo & Sarvy Mahdavi, EPA Region 9 (Jan.
28, 2009); Telephone Interview with Carl Young and Carrie Paige, EPA Region 6 (Nov. 25,
2008). Mr. Young and Ms. Paige explained that their office tries to avoid overcontrolling
because the associated compliance costs are serious, and Ms. Lo likewise explained that
creating a significant margin of error would increase costs and generate resistance. I asked




emphasis on flexibility and individualized judgment." EPA staff
consistently told me that they eschew any formalized standard, and that
while they take seriously the importance of assuring rigorous
attainment demonstrations, they resolve questions of plan uncertainty
on a case-by-case basis."'  Second, the guidance's recommended
approach, if followed, would indulge a substantial risk of plan failure.
In many contexts, scientists are unwilling to assert any conclusion with
more than a five percent chance of being incorrect,"' yet here, where
the likely consequences of error are air quality that violates legal
requirements and the need for an expensive new planning effort, the
EPA suggests a "best-estimate" approach likely to produce only
slightly better than even odds of compliance."2
That approach also has important consequences for the
transparency of SIP approvals. In the absence of any general standard
for addressing the uncertain prospects of SIP success, decisions about
uncertainty management can become not only ad hoc, but also
invisible and unreviewable. The EPA approves SIPs through notice
and comment rulemaking, but the rulemaking documents rarely
discuss how confident planners are of their plans' prospects of
success."3 Nor do many SIPs or attainment demonstrations contain
such discussion. For example, in a recent study, James Fine and I
found no discussion of confidence levels or margins for error, nor
anything other than highly general and sometimes inaccurate
109. EPA, supm note 89, at 17-19.
110. Telephone Interview with Marcia Spink, supra note 93; Telephone Interview with
Paul Truchan, EPA Region 2 (Sept. 29, 2008); Telephone Interview with Carl Young & Carrie
Paige, supm note 108.
111. Judith S. Weis, Scientific Uncertainty and Environmental Policy: Four Case
Studies, in SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND ENviRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING 160 (John
Lemons ed., 1996).
112. Some EPA staff told me that if a model predicted attainment prior to a weight-of-
evidence determination, the plan would probably produce attainment, primarily because the
models incorporate conservative assumptions. In other circumstances, however, air quality
modelers have adopted key assumptions that were not at all conservative. See, e.g., Fine &
Owen, supra note 30, at 930 n. 144, 962-65 (quoting a meteorologist who had been involved
in multiple unsuccessful SIP amendments and describing a failed SIP amendment).
113. I base this assertion on Westlaw searches of SIP approval documents (which the
EPA publishes in the Federal Register) from the years 1997 and 2007. I selected those years
randomly, except that I deliberately chose years with different presidential administrations.
With few exceptions, those approval documents say hardly anything about addressing plan
uncertainty. However, EPA Region 6 staff pointed me to a recent proposed approval for the
Dallas-Fort Worth Area. They thought, and I agree, that the proposed rule provides a clear
and accessible discussion of uncertainty management. See, e.g., Approval and Promulgation
of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Texas; Attainment Demonstration for the Dallas/Fort
Worth 1997 8-Hour Ozone Nonattainment Area, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,203 (proposed July 14,
2008) (to be codified 40 C.ER. pt. 52).
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discussion of uncertainties; yet we were reviewing a SIP that had faced
long odds of success.'14 That does not mean such uncertainties are not
confronted. Inevitably they are; as modelers make assumptions and
integrate data into their models, they decide how much error risk they
are willing to accept."' Sometimes they know they are adopting risky
plans. In other circumstances, they may be quite confident that their
plans are conservative, or that uncertainties are minimal." 6  But to
external observers, and even perhaps to nonmodelers within the
agency, those decisions can be all but invisible.
That invisibility creates a significant distinction between
uncertainty management in air quality planning and in fishery
management. While in fishery management the presence of
confidence estimates facilitates oversight, including judicial review,
and ultimately allowed for the D.C. Circuit to establish a generally
applicable standard for managing uncertainty, no parallel process has
occurred in CAA litigation. Environmental Defense v EPA,"7 a recent
case involving the EPA's approval of a New York State SIP, illustrates
the difference. Rather than predicting compliance, New York's
simulation model predicted nonattainment by a wide margin."8 When
the EPA checked the modeling, it obtained similar results."9 Based on
their judgment that the modeled prediction rested on uncertain
assumptions and conservative methodologies, New York and the EPA
both used a weight-of-evidence approach to revise their models'
estimates to levels closer to, but still exceeding, the regulatory
standard. ° They then relied on the state's promise to implement
additional regulatory measures-a promise that the state did not
114. Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 960-62.
115. Modelers also employ multiple techniques to determine the extent of uncertainty.
See, e.g., EPA, supra note 89, at 205-08 (providing examples of graphical representations of
model performance).
116. See Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 957 n.286 (quoting a state regulator
acknowledging that an approved SIP amendment had "long odds" of success); sources cited
supra note 93 (describing confidence in some predictions).
117. 369 E3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
118. Id. at 198 (the regulatory one-hour standard for ozone was 120 parts per billion,
and New York's model runs predicted values of 169 and 171 parts per billion).
119. Idat 199.
120. Id at 198-200. Such corrections are common. Because models are imperfect
tools, modelers are wary about letting model results trump observational data or common
sense. See EPA, supra note 89, at 17-19 (explaining the reasons for using a "weight of
evidence determination"). But there are dangers in such adjustments. One of the best uses of
models is to test conventional wisdom, and if modelers use conventional wisdom to adjust
modeling results, the modeling process risks circularity. Differentiating adjustments made
because of informed professional judgment from those made because of political pressure or
administrative convenience also can be difficult.
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keep--to support their ultimate prediction of attainment.' With all
that adjustment, the resulting attainment demonstration cannot have
produced strong odds of success.'2 But the EPA's approval decision
says hardly anything, quantitative or qualitative, about those odds.' 2
The reviewing court did not even consider whether the plan's prospects
of success were too uncertain, and Environmental Defense-an
organization experienced with air quality litigation and one of the
prevailing plaintiffs in Daley-focused on other issues.'24 The requisite
level of certainty was clearly an important policy issue-millions of
people breathe New York City's air-and could have been an important
legal issue. Instead, it disappeared from view.
C Endangered Species
If air quality management exemplifies a highly discretionary
approach to planning uncertainty, Endangered Species Act (ESA)
implementation follows a slightly more legalized model.' The ESA
provides slightly more guidance than the CAA. The agencies
primarily responsible for implementing the ESA have fleshed out that
statutory language with guidance documents. The resulting
prescriptions are a little vague, somewhat internally inconsistent, and
leave room for substantial discretion. But on paper they are
nevertheless more robust than the approach created by the EPA'S CAA
guidance. The agencies' checkered implementation record indicates
that a paper standard does not automatically translate into revised
outcomes; while the ESA and guidance ostensibly require caution, the
implementing agencies have often indulged plans with poor odds of
success.' Nevertheless, those standards, although sometimes ignored
121. Envtl. Def, 369 E3d at200.
122. In an interview, I asked an EPA planner from Region 2 whether the agency would
issue an approval if presented with a SIP that planners felt had about a sixty percent chance of
succeeding. He responded that a sixty percent chance seemed too low. Telephone Interview
with Paul Truchan, supra note 110. That suggests that the approval in EnvironmentalDefense
v EPA may have been more risky than the norm, at least for Region 2. But, compared with
outcomes in other major urban regions, the result seems hardly anomalous.
123. See geneallyApproval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 67 Fed. Reg.
5170 (Feb. 4, 2002) (codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 52). The document discusses
potentially uncertain assumptions, and offers justifications for relying upon those
assumptions, but contains no attempt to synthesize its uncertainty analysis into an overall
assessment, quantitative or qualitative, of success odds.
124. See Envtl. Def, 369 E3d at 200 (describing Environmental Defense's claims).
125. 16U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544(2006).
126. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study
in Maladaptive Managemen 55 UCLA L. RFv. 293, 297 (2007) (describing a tendency
toward "risky regulatory approvals"); ifir notes 151-157 and accompanying text.
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or circumvented, do appear to have changed some outcomes."7 Thus,
the ESA illustrates both the limitations and promise of even general
guidance on plan uncertainty: while susceptible to circumvention and
by no means a panacea, such guidance can change results.
In several ways, the ESA emphasizes prospective planning.
When listing or delisting species, the wildlife agencies must consider
whether existing regulatory measures will be adequate to protect the
species, and those measures often derive from state or federal plans.'28
Once species are listed, actions that "take" listed species are generally
prohibited, but the ESA creates an exception for "takes" consistent
with approved "habitat conservation plans."' 29 Section 7 prohibits
federal agencies from taking actions likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of listed species, but federal agencies may proceed with
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" to actions that might create
jeopardy, and those reasonable and prudent alternatives usually involve
some sort of mitigatibn plan or project modification designed to avoid
jeopardy.3 Finally, when species are listed, the wildlife agencies may
develop recovery plans specifying measures that should facilitate the
species' eventual delisting."' Consequently, many of the implementing
agencies' decisions are contingent upon their predictions about the
performance of some sort of plan.
Because of pervasive uncertainties, agencies rarely can guarantee
that their plans will succeed.'32 Information deficits are ubiquitous, for
understanding species' needs often requires more research than
agencies have budgets to perform, and academic research priorities do
not often match agencies' information needs.' Species populations
tend to vary stochastically and to be sensitive to a range of influences,
127. See infra notes 158-164 and accompanying text.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
129. Id. §§ 1538-1539; seeCamacho, supra note 126, at 301-06.
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1536; see, e.g., OliverA. Houck, The Endangered SpeciesAct and Its
Implementation by the US. Departments of Intenor and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. RE. 277,
317-22 (1993) (describing reasonable and prudent alternatives).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f).
132. See COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, BD. ON
ENVTL. STUDIES & TOXICOLOGY, COMM'N ON LIFE Scis., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 143-54 (1995); Fraser Shilling, Do Habitat Conservation
Plans Protect Endangered Species., 276 ScL. MAG. 1662, 1663 (1997) (noting that habitat
conservation plans typically "lack adequate baseline information about population size of
target species and actual habitat use, primarily because of the generalized lack of such
information").
133. See Holly Doremus, Data Gaps , Natural Resource Management Smitng for
LeaksAlong the Infonnation Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 407, 417-23 (2008).
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some of them also variable in their intensity.'34 Endangered species
protection also depends upon human behavior, with variations in
development pressure and resource needs all affecting the availability
of habitat and the ease or contentiousness of implementing regulatory
constraints. Consequently, plans for species protection and recovery
rarely come with guarantees attached.135
The ESA itself provides some general guidance about how such
uncertainties should be addressed. The overarching purposes of the
ESA suggest a strongly protective approach-as the United States
Supreme Court famously stated, the "language, history, and structure
of the [ESA] indicate[] beyond doubt that Congress intended
endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities"-but that
approach is not prescribed in language sufficiently specific to
foreclose some interpretive discretion.136 Species must be listed as
endangered if they are in "danger" of extinction or as threatened if they
are "likely" to face such danger "in the foreseeAble future."'' 7 While
those terms do not demand certainty about the species' safety, a
species cannot be out of danger if its survival hinges on a plan with
less than a coin toss's odds of providing sufficient protection.3 '
Similarly, federal agencies must ensure that their actions are "not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence" of a listed species or adversely
modify a critical habitat.' While "jeopardize" which the ESA does
not define, is an amorphous term,'4° "likely" again implies a
probability standard. It suggests that an action that might jeopardize a
species, but probably will not, could legally proceed while an action
134. See HOLLING ET AL., supra note 12, at 33-35; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supM
note 132, at 144-45.
135. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 132, at 145 ("[C]ritical data ... are
usually lacking.").
136. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (2006) (defining "endangered" and "threatened"
species); id § 1533 (describing the factors used in determining whether a species is
"endangered" or "threatened").
138. See, e.g., W Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 535 E Supp. 2d 1173,
1183-85 (D. Idaho 2007) (rejecting an application of this standard); Trout Unlimited v. Lohn,
Civ.No.06-1493-ST, 2007 WL 2973568, at *13-18 (D. Or. July 13, 2007) (discussing the
meaning of the "likely" standard).
139. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
140. See Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a
Game Protected Species Can't Win, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 114, 126-28 (2001) (explaining
possible interpretations of the term).
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that might be harmless but probably will have a jeopardizing effect
would be illegal.'1
Habitat conservation plans (HCPs) involve a similar standard.
An HCP may be approved, and species may be taken, only if the
permittee provides assurances of adequate funding and if "the taking
will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery
of the species in the wild"' "2 That language does not suggest that an
HCP must create certainty that the species will survive; arguably, a
species' overall survival and recovery odds will be improved as long as
the conservation measures have better than even odds of offsetting the
take. But that language does indicate that an HCP that might benefit
the species, but more likely will lead to increased threats, should not be
approved. Only with recovery plans does the ESA provide no
guidance at all. While those plans are to facilitate species survival and
"conservation" a term defined as improvement sufficient to allow
delisting, the statute does not say how sure the agencies must be that
the plans will achieve those goals.'3
With most federal environmental statutes, there has been a dearth
of generally applicable agency regulations, or even guidance
documents with some measure of specificity, fleshing out the
appropriate approach to plan uncertainty. ESA implementation is
partly consistent with that trend; while the United States Fish &
Wildlife Service (FWS) and NOAA Fisheries have promulgated joint
regulations, those regulations do little to flesh out the statutory
language on probability standards.'" The agencies' implementation
handbooks, however, do provide additional, and somewhat mixed,
guidance on the management of plan uncertainty.
The agencies' consultation handbook explains that where
outcomes are uncertain, "[t]he Services are then expected to provide
141. The analysis is complicated by language in the Endangered Species Act's
legislative history stating that species should receive "the benefit of the doubt." H.R. REP.
No. 96-697, at 12 (Conf. Rep.), repnintedin 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2576; see Conner v.
Burford, 848 E2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing this language as indicative of
congressional intent).
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv). Section 1539(a)(2)(B) also requires that the
applicant provide "such other assurances as [FWS or NOAA Fisheries] may require that the
plan will be implemented," but does not require FWS or NOAA Fisheries to actually demand
such assurances. Id. at § 1539(a)(2)(B).
143. Id § 1533(f) (lacking any reference as to how agencies shall ensure that their
goals are met); id § 1532(3) (defining "conservation").
144. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.02-402.16 (2008) (consultation regulations).
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the benefit of the doubt to the species.'""' Accordingly, the
consultation handbook provides that where data gaps exist, the wildlife
agency will either ask the action agency to fill those gaps or proceed
while making cautious assumptions that favor the species.' 6 Though
not particularly specific, that language clearly suggests that plan
uncertainty should be managed with caution.
The HCP handbook suggests a more permissive approach,
though the signals are mixed. While it cautions that "[t]he Services
should not approve an HCP using conservation strategies that have a
low likelihood of success," it also asserts that "the base mitigation
strategy or initial minimization and mitigation measures ... must be
sufficiently vigorous so that the Service may reasonably believe that
they will be successful" and recommends adaptive management
strategies, rather than outright permit denials, where significant
uncertainties remain."' Read in isolation, that "may reasonably
believe" language would set the bar low, implying that even where
outcomes are highly uncertain and reasonable people would disagree
about the likely effectiveness of an HCP, it could be approved. But the
HCP handbook also notes that an HCP approval is a federal action
subject to section 7-including, presumably, the benefit-of-the-doubt
requirements.'48 It also requires that HCPs include funding guarantees
sufficient to address unforeseen circumstances, and urges the inclusion
of implementation commitments where the plan will depend upon
third party actions. 9 Finally, it exhorts, but does not require, the
Services to ensure that HCPs provide net benefits for species. '
The records of FWS and NOAA Fisheries in implementing these
provisions is mixed.'' In making listing decisions, the FWS and
145. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT CONSULTATION HANDBOOK: PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING SECTION 7
CONSULTATIONS AND CONFERENCES 1-6 (1998).
146. See id. at 3-12 (stating that the services will not provide a "no effect" concurrence
where there is uncertainty about possible effects, unless those effects are of insignificant
magnitude or extremely low probability). Less conservatively, the Consultation Handbook
also states that when the agencies are considering cumulative impacts, they should consider
only other future actions that are "reasonably certain" to occur. Id. at 4-30.
147. NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., HABITAT
CONSERVATION PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK 3-24 to 3-
25 (1996) (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 7-4.
149. Id. at 7-4 to 7-6.
150. Id.at3-21.
151. That record also is not well documented. While many case studies consider ESA
implementation, the resulting evidence is largely anecdotal, and there are few data sets that
allow consideration of the agencies' approach to plan uncertainty across a range of decisions.
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NOAA Fisheries have sometimes relied upon highly optimistic
predictions of the success of existing management plans, even where
those plans were quite inchoate.'52 Observers have criticized this
approach to consultation, arguing that instead of giving the benefit of
the doubt to species, the FWS and NOAA Fisheries have
systematically selected the least burdensome approach that might offer
protection.'53 Studies of the HCP process have produced similar
conclusions, noting a tendency to adopt private developers' plans
despite what appear, to be marginal odds of success and minimal
provisions for ongoing monitoring or adjustment."' The agencies
often seem to be interested primarily in ducking controversy as quietly
as possible,'55 and one easy way to do so is to use low probability
standards and to adopt any plan that mightwork.' That approach is,
in theory, fundamentally inconsistent with the statutory directives and
the handbooks' emphasis on providing species the benefit of the doubt.
But with both ultimate outcomes and probabilities somewhat
ambiguously defined by the statute, regulations, and guidance, the
Consequently, general conclusions about ESA implementation involve their own dose of
uncertainty.
152. See, e.g., Houck, supra note 130, at 287-88 (describing reasons for not listing
salmon runs and the northern spotted owl); Cassidy, supra note 30, at 177 (criticizing "a
longstanding agency practice of deferring to state and local conservation efforts-even if
those efforts are unimplemented, unproven, or voluntary-rather than listing a species under
the ESA").
153. See Houck, supra note 130, at 316-21 (concluding that "there is little evidence
that [formal consultation] is changing [outcomes] very much at all"); Rohlf, supia note 140,
at 115 ("[T]he concept ofjeopardy often amounts to little more than a vague threat employed
by FWS and NMFS to negotiate relatively minor modifications to federal and non-federal
actions"); see also Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy,
86 TEX. L. REv. 1601, 1606-09, 1613-17 (2008) (documenting pressure to issue decisions less
protective than agency scientists would have preferred, but also scientists' resistance-
sometimes successful, sometimes not-to that pressure). See generally Michael C. Blumm et
al., Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery
Under the Endangered Species Act 36 ENVTL. L. 709 (2006).
154. See Camacho, supra note 126, at 323-35; Holly Doremus, Adaptive
Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional Challenges of 'New Age"
Environmental Protection, 41 WAsmuRN L.J. 50, 68-74 (2001); Shilling, supra note 132, at
1662-63 (describing one rather permissive plan).
155. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 58 ("[T]he story of ESA implementation since
1978 consists generally of the Services exploiting their discretion to the fullest to avoid
political controversy.").
156. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 E Supp. 1081, 1089 (WD. Wash.),




agencies can find sufficient flexibility to take such permissive
approaches, or to shift approaches on a case-by-case basis.'57
There are, however, contrasting indications that sometimes the
implementing agencies act, or are judicially compelled to act, as
though subject to probability standards with teeth. While the wildlife
agencies have sometimes been rather optimistic in relying on
protection plans to avoid listing, the courts have been more skeptical,
generally rejecting reliance on plans that appear to have poor odds of
implementation or success.' Anecdotal evidence suggests that
sometimes consultation processes do provide species with some
benefit of the doubt, even in the face of political heat.'59 That
anecdotal evidence comports with a common perception among
regulated groups that the ESA is zealously, and sometimes
overzealously, implemented. Even if most academic observers are
skeptical of the overall accuracy of that perception, its existence
suggests that the wildlife agencies sometimes take protective stands
despite uncertain information and heavy resistance.'6 °
The overall track record of the ESA also suggests that the
agencies sometimes take cautious approaches to plan success. While
relatively few listed species have recovered, studies in the late 1990s
concluded that few listed species went extinct, and most listed species,
over time, showed gradual improvement.'6 ' Multiple factors, some
having little to do with management of plan uncertainty, may have
157. See, e.g., Blumm et al., supm note 153, at 734-35, 741-43 (describing such
shifting standards).
158. SeeCassidy, supm note 30, at 179 & n.16 (listing cases).
159. See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH
BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS 118-28 (2008) (describing
partially successful efforts by FWS and NOAA Fisheries to implement protective plans in the
Klamath Basin).
160. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
161. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of the
Endangered Species Act 82 CORNELL L. REv. 356 (1997) (book review). Some species,
however, have continued to decline despite longstanding regulatory coverage. See, e.g.,
Blumm et al., supra note 153 (describing continuing difficulties with Columbia Basin
salmon).
The recovery struggles also may derive from causes other than approaches to planning
uncertainty. The recovery planning provisions are weak. See Federico Cheever, Recovery
Planning, the Courts and the Endangered Species Ac; 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 106, 108
(2001) ("Courts have been universally unwilling to order agencies to undertake recovery
actions."). The services also have adhered to regulations that, according to commentators and
several appellate courts, illegally read key habitat and recovery protections out of the Act.
See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 E3d 1059, 1069-71 (9th
Cir. 2004) (rejecting the "adverse modification" definition as inconsistent with the statute);
50 C.ER. § 402.02 (2008) (defining "destruction or adverse modification" and "jeopardy");
Houck, supra note 130, at 298-301; Rohlf, supm note 140, at 118-19.
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contributed to those successes, but they would have been unlikely if
the agencies were as consistently tolerant of plan failure as some
implementation critiques seem to suggest. '  Considering the
informational shortfalls faced by agency staff, the budgetary
restrictions under which they operate, ' and the commonly intense
resistance to protective measures-resistance that comes from outside
the agencies and, often, from within-that modest evidence of success
begins to seem impressive.'" Protection levels fall well short of many
observers' expectations, and clearer and more protective standards
might produce substantial improvement. But it is unlikely that ESA
implementation could have achieved any success at all if agency staff
did not sometimes feel empowered to demand assurance that plans
will succeed, and did not sometimes perceive themselves to be
prohibited from adopting plans that probably would not work.
D NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct
While CAA and ESA implementation exemplify approaches
largely based on internal guidance and agency staff discretion,
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) implementation illustrates
the possibility of a different evolution.' As in fishery management,
NEPA's probability standards have been articulated almost exclusively
by judges. Those standards are superficially strict; they facilitate
different outcomes in some circumstances, and those changes illustrate
their value. Nevertheless, weaknesses in those standards also illustrate
some of the problems that arise when probability standards must be
created and enforced entirely by the judiciary.
One might wonder why NEPA would necessitate a probability
standard. NEPA, according to the standard characterization, "simply
guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result," and once an
162. See supm notes 128-131 and accompanying text (explaining the central
importance the Act places on planning).
163. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 64 (describing congressional attempts to
undercut ESA implementation through low appropriations).
164. See id. at 62; Houck, supra note 130. In a passage that reflects common
academic perceptions of ESA implementation, Doremus writes:
Under the intense pressure that has been the norm for the ESA, they will seek out
any flexibility the statute allows, and exploit it to deflect controversy. They will
seize any opportunity to defer controversial decisions into the future, delegate those
decisions to others, optimistically interpret data, and assume that uncertain or as
yet unproven initiatives will rescue disappearing species.
See Doremus, supra note 154, at 62.
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2006).
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agency prepares a legally adequate environmental impact statement
(EIS), it may pursue whatever substantive outcomes it pleases.'" In
practice, however, agencies usually attempt to comply with NEPA not
by preparing EISs but by preparing environmental assessments and
adopting "Findings of No Significant Impact" (FONSI), which they
can legally adopt only if their projects will not create significant
environmental impacts.' 7 To avoid creating such significant impacts,
agencies often rely on mitigation measures, which usually are plans for
future action.'68 In practice, therefore, NEPA often creates a planning
process somewhat like that of the CAA or the Magnuson-Stevens Act:
it requires ex ante plans designed to prevent significant environmental
impacts, and the legality of approval decisions is contingent upon
expectations about those plans' success.169
As in other areas of environmental planning, the success of those
plans is often uncertain. They may involve untested environmental
strategies, rely on uncertain funding, or depend upon action by
reluctant permittees. '  Rarely will plan implementation be checked;
NEPA establishes no verification requirements.'7' Substantial
questions, therefore, often exist about whether mitigation measures
will actually work, or whether they will just serve as convenient
excuses to avoid the expense of EIS preparation.'72 The few studies to
examine the effectiveness of mitigation measures are "not
encouraging": "fewer than one out of three verifiable predictions
correctly forecast both the direction and the approximate magnitude of
the environmental impact, while most predictions were simply
unverifiable, either through fundamental imprecision or for lack of
follow up data."'
7 3
166. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998).
167. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, WtitherNEPA?, 12 N.YU. ENvTL. L.J. 333, 347-48
(2004) (documenting the prevalence of FONSIs).
168. See id at 348; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Governments Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REv 903, 932-38
(2002).
169. See Karkkainen, supra note 168, at 906-08. The primary difference is that
NEPA's outcome standards are qualitative and amorphous.
170. See id. at 926-27 (describing the uncertainty of NEPA required predictions).
171. Karkkainen, supra note 167, at 344.
172. See McGarity, supra note 30, at 577-78 (explaining why mitigation measures are
not always implemented).
173. Karkkainen, supra note 168, at 928; see Paul J. Culhane, The Precision and
Accuracy of US Environmental Impact Statements, 8 ENvrL. MONnORNG & AsSESSMENT
217, 235-36 (1987) (concluding that few predictions in a sample of EISs were demonstrably
wrong, but that many predictions were not amenable to verification).
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Despite that uncertainty, neither the statute itself nor the Council
on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) implementing regulations say how
certain a lead agency should be that its mitigation measures will
succeed. The CEQ's regulations say nothing more. In fact, neither the
statute nor the CEQ's implementing regulations even refer to mitigated
FONSIs, which arose as an invention of implementing agencies and
received their legal stamp of approval from the courts.'74
Filling this void, the courts put forth their own standard. It
appears protective: agencies must "convincingly establish" that
mitigation measures will succeed in reducing impacts to a less than
significant level, and if "substantial questions" about the measures'
effectiveness remain, EIS preparation is mandatory.' Accordingly,
courts have rejected reliance upon inchoate or speculative mitigation
measures 6 or upon mitigation measures whose effectiveness, even if
implemented, is unknown.' 7  They similarly rejected reliance on
measures demonstrably unlikely to be enforced, and demanded "more
than mere vague statements of good intentions.' ' 78  They have not
174. See Karkkainen, supm note 168, at 944-45 ("[T]he mitigated FONSI exists in a
legal gray zone, generally accepted by the courts but without the safe harbor protection of
explicit statutory or regulatory authorization or standards."). The CEQ did attempt to
partially address the issue in one of its first guidance documents, where it sought to allow
reliance on mitigation measures "only if they are imposed by statute or regulation, or
submitted by an applicant or agency as part of the original proposal." Forty Most Asked
Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg.
18,026, 18,038 (Mar. 23, 1981) (codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pts. 1500-08). Agencies
and courts have generally rejected that guidance. Albert I. Herson, Project Mitigation
Revisited- Most Courts Approve Findings of No Significant Impact Justified by Mitigation,
13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 51, 51-52 (1986).
175. Conner v. Burford, 848 F2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988); Cabinet Mountains
Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 E2d 678, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See generally Am. Bird Conservancy, Inc. v. FCC, 516 F.3d 1027, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(holding that where an action's environmental consequences are uncertain but may be
significant, an EIS must be prepared).
176. E.g., O'Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 477 E3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2007)
("[T]he EA provides only cursory detail as to what those measures are and how they serve to
reduce those impacts to a less-than-significant level .... [T]he feasibility of the mitigation
measures is not self-evident ...."); Conner, 848 E2d at 1450 (rejecting reliance on
unspecified regulatory measures).
177. E.g., Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214
(9th Cir. 1998); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 1998)
("Without analytical data to support the proposed mitigation measures, we are not persuaded
that they amount to anything more than a 'mere listing' of good management practices."); The
Steamboaters v. FERC, 759 E2d 1382, 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The problem here is that FERC
fails to explain specifically how the conditions would mitigate the impact of the project.
Further, the proposed conditions provide only general guidelines."); Found. for N. Am. Wild
Sheep v. U.S. Dep't ofAgric., 681 E2d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1982).
178. Audubon Soc'y of Cent. Ark. v. Dailey, 977 E2d 428, 435-36 (8th Cir. 1992)
(internal quotations omitted) (rejecting reliance on a mitigation measure where "evidence...
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required absolute certainty or any binding legal commitment to
mitigation measures; generally, "the mitigating measures need not be a
condition of the permit ... nor even a contractual obligation.""' But
the general judicial trend seems to be toward at least reciting a rule
demanding a moderately high level of assurance. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in National
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v Babbit4 in which it rejected reliance on
mitigation measures that the Park Service asserted "could" work,
exemplifies that standard approach.'80
For several reasons, however, that standard, as applied, contains
less stringency than meets the eye. First, courts often find mitigation
measures to be sufficient simply because the lead agency could
enforce them.'8' But a finding of enforceability does not ensure that a
violation will be enforced, or that a mitigation measure will actually be
fully and successfully implemented."2 Enforcement requires time and
money and means imposing burdens the lead agency may have no
wish to impose, particularly if, as is often the case, the lead agency has
a weak institutional commitment to environmental protection."3 The
agency also will have disincentives even to discover implementation
problems, for if violations are found, or if the mitigation measure is
implemented but significant adverse impacts nevertheless result, the
agency's own original decision will appear questionable. For these
reasons, Thomas McGarity has charged that "[i]f the agency may
ignore its enforcement obligations with impunity, and if adversely
affected members of the public are not empowered to enforce the
conditions, the EISs are inadequate and the FONSIs are phantoms."'8"
More fundamentally, some NEPA decisions dilute the standard by
conflating two separate inquiries. In deciding whether the agency
properly declined to prepare an EIS, courts generally must ask whether
the agency took an action contrary to law. Specifically, the court must
gave every reason to doubt" its enforceability); e.g, Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Babbitt, 241 E3d 722, 733-36 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a FONSI where "uncertainty that
exists as to whether the mitigation measures would work").
179. Audubon Soc'y of Cent. Ark., 977 E2d at 436.
180. 241 F.3d at 734-35.
181. SeeMcGarity, supra note 30, at 597-99.
182. See id. at 601 (criticizing decisions that "were probably too solicitous of the
agency when they failed to discount the benefits of stipulations and permit conditions by the
very real probability that they would not be enforced").
183. See generally Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 E2d 1109, 1112-15 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (concluding that NEPA was designed to
force reluctant agencies to act).
184. McGarity, supra note 30, at 605.
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decide whether the agency declined to prepare an EIS despite the
possibility of significant environmental impacts. The court must also
ask whether the agency considered relevant factors and engaged in a
reasoned inquiry.'85 In theory, a court could answer the former
question in the negative and the latter in the affirmative; an agency
would act unlawfully if it approved a FONSI despite significant
acknowledged uncertainties, even if it had engaged in careful
discussion of those uncertainties. In practice, however, some courts
appear to blend the two questions, finding that uncertainty is no bar to
a FONSI as long as the uncertainty is carefully explored and
discussed.'86 That approach creates a fundamentally different, and
substantially more failure-tolerant, standard.
While somewhat anomalous, that line of cases highlights a
hazard inherent in leaving the formulation and application of
probability standards entirely up to the judiciary.'87 The process of
developing such standards can force courts into uncomfortable
territory. Those processes may be technically complex and laden with
policy questions, which courts may be reluctant to resolve. While
legal issues will arise, discerning the lines between technical analysis,
185. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,42-43 (1983).
186. See, e.g., Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F3d 1324, 1332-35 (9th Cir. 1992)
(upholding a FONSI reliant upon mitigation measures, despite the lead agency's concession
"that the effectiveness of the mitigation measures is uncertain," because "the record in this
case reveals no complete failure to consider crucial factors"); North Carolina v. Hudson, 731
E Supp. 1261, 1269-73 (E.D.N.C. 1990) (upholding a FONSI despite disagreement, which
the lead agency appeared to concede was reasonable, from other agencies' experts about
whether significant impacts would result from the project); see also Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal.
v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F3d 177, 205 (4th Cir. 2009) (upholding reliance on mitigation
measures despite acknowledging that "support for [the lead agency's] claim that the proposed
[mitigation] measures have good potential for success is admittedly limited").
187. Those cases have an important parallel, albeit from a slightly different context. In
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87
(1983), the Supreme Court upheld a decision to exclude uncertain impacts from evaluation
largely because the uncertainty was candidly discussed. Baltimore Gas addressed the legality
of the NRC's decision to prescribe, through rulemaking, a "zero-release" rule stating that
individual EISs should not consider the possibility of releases of nuclear waste, on the theory
that such releases would be prevented. Id at 90-94. That was a dubious proposition. See
discussion hla Part HF. The Court acknowledged that "no one suggests that the
uncertainties are trivial or the potential effects insignificant if time proves the zero-release
assumption to have been seriously wrong?' Baltimore Gas, 462 U.S. at 98. But the Court
upheld the rule, stating that "it simply cannot be said that the Commission ignored or failed to
disclose the uncertainties surrounding its zero-release assumption." Id. at 100; see Daniel A.
Farber, Confronting Uncertainty Under NEPA, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHiP 17-18 (2009)
(critiquing the Baltimore Gas decision).
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policy analysis, and legal analysis may be difficult.'88 Courts also are
likely to worry that in articulating too specific a standard, they will risk
micromanaging agency procedural choices.'89 Those constraints do not
mean that judicially articulated NEPA standards lack meaning or
value. In some cases, courts have invoked those standards to require
EIS preparation, and those decisions create incentives that can help
balance the overwhelming administrative convenience of paper
mitigation measures.'" But courts may shy away from setting
aggressive standards, or, as in the NEPA context, from carefully and
consistently policing standards that do not come from Congress or
from the agency itself. Deference, even where it is not appropriate, is
likely to be quite common.
E. Water Quality
The Clean Water Act (CWA) relies upon a dual regulatory
approach, in which technology-based controls complement a planning-
based system.'9' That planning system also contends with significant
uncertainties. But compared to the statutes discussed so far, the CWA
contains slightly stronger signals-albeit still weak ones-about how
planning uncertainty should be managed. In an otherwise problematic
regulatory system, those signals stand out as a positive feature worth
imitating.
The CWA's planning-based system starts by requiring the states
to develop water quality standards.' 2 States then must identify water
bodies where technology-based point source controls will not be
sufficient to ensure compliance with those standards,'93 and the states
also must engage in "continuing planning process[es]" designed to
bring deficient areas into compliance.'" The CWA's primary planning
mechanism is something known as a "total maximum daily load"
(TMDL), which serves as a pollution budget for the impacted water
body.9 TMDL-based regulation should, in theory, reach both point
and nonpoint pollution sources, and thus the TMDL system should
188. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 187, at 17-18 (criticizing the Supreme Court for
conflating legal and technical issues in its Baltimore Gas decision).
189. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543-47 (1978).
190. See supm notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
191. See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); OLIVERA. HOUCK,
THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAw, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 3 (1999).
192. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b)-(c) (2006).
193. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
194. Id. § 1313(e); Pronsolino, 291 F3d at 1128-29.
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C); Pronsolino,291 E3dat 1127-28.
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provide a valuable complement to the technology-based permit
program, which reaches point sources alone. 96 But in creating TMDLs
and associated regulatory plans, water quality agencies must contend
with significant uncertainties. Shortages of baseline data, complex
and poorly understood contaminant pathways, and a variety of other
complexities preclude agencies from knowing with certainty that their
pollution budgets are right.197
The TMDL system has been heavily criticized as an incomplete
planning approach.'98 While generating lists of impaired water bodies
and TMDLs for those bodies clearly is mandatory, the CWA does not
fully specify how states are to translate those budgets into legal
obligations. Some planning is required,'99 and TMDLs should be
considered when setting effluent limitations in point source permits."°°
But, unlike the CAA, the CWA neither contains detailed standards
explaining how the plans should be enforced nor empowers the EPA to
reject plans and create its own enforceable substitutes."' To add to the
complications, the EPA and the states ignored even the clear and
mandatory obligations for years. Until compelled to do so by
environmental groups' lawsuits, the states generated few lists of
impaired water bodies and hardly any TMDLs, and the EPA focused
its attentions on implementing the CWA's point source controls."'
Consequently, the evolution of the program has lagged, and few states
have turned TMDLs into effective regulatory programs.
Despite those flaws, section 1313(d)(1)(C) does contain one
feature worth imitating, albeit in strengthened form. It states that each
196. See David S. Baron, Water Quality Standards for Rivers and Lakes: Emerging
Issues, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 559, 559-60 (1995).
197. HOUCK, supm note 191, at 58-59, 171, 195; CoMM. To ASSESS THE SCIENTIFIC
BASIS OF THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD APPROACH To WATER POLLUTION REDUCTION,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH TO WATER QUALITY
MANAGEMENT 2, 20, 28-30 (2001) [hereinafter TMDL APPROACH]. The NRC Committee
argued, however, that these uncertainties can and should be managed through statistical
uncertainty analyses. TMDL APPROACH, supra, at 10, 73-76.
198. See, e.g., HOUCK, supra note 191, at 206-07. Houck also questions whether even
a complete planning approach would be as effective as alternative regulatory systems.
199. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e).
200. Id. § 1341(a) (requiring that federal licensees and permittees comply with "all
applicable provisions" of section 1313, among other sections); id. § 1313(d)(4) (providing
water quality compliance requirement for NPDES permits); 40 C.ER. § 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B)
(2008).
201. See HOUCK, supra note 191, at 206-07 (contrasting the programs). The EPA can
reject TMDLs and promulgate its own substitutes. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). However, it has
limited power to translate TMDLs into constraints on individual sources. See Pronsolino v.
Nastri, 291 E3d 1123, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002).
202. HOUCK, supM note 191, at 49-64; seeBaron, supra note 196, at 578.
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TMDL "shall be established at a level necessary to implement the
applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge
concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water
quality.""2 3 In other words, to account for uncertainty, the budget must
overshoot the mark. Section 1313 does not state how much of a buffer
TMDLs should provide; that choice is left to agency discretion. The
EPA also has not fleshed out that requirement with more specific
regulations, though it has promulgated some general guidance, and
instead has left its decisionmakers broad flexibility to select their
margins on a project-by-project basis." But even if substantial
flexibility remains, the pertinent statutory language indicates that if, as
in Daley, the agency's best estimate is that achieving the TMDUs limits
would not produce compliance, the TMDL is not legal. That small bit
of direction sets the CWA apart from the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the
CAA, and NEPA; none of those statutes explicitly require an
analogous approach."5
Because the TMDL program lay dormant for decades,
implementation remains in the early stages, and few cases evaluate the
implications of this margin-of-safety requirement. Evidence from
agency decisions is also scant, and one study of early TMDLs found
that the states did little to explain their margins of safety and
sometimes simply ignored the requirement."6 Even with strict
observance of the margin-of-safety requirement, the many other
weaknesses in the statutory structure mean that this provision alone
will never be enough to ensure an effective planning approach.
Nevertheless, two judicial decisions do suggest it can produce
significant benefits if integrated into a more robust planning scheme.
203. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(1)(C)-(D).
204. See 40 CER. § 130.7(c) (echoing the statutory language); EPA, GUIDANCE FOR
WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS 15 (1991), available at
http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/models/library/SASD0l09.pdf [hereinafter EPA, GUIDANCE
FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS] (stating that larger margins of safety are
"appropriate" where uncertainties are substantial, but not establishing any requirement); EPA,
Guidelines for Reviewing TMDLs Under Existing Regulations Issued in 1992,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/guidance/fma152002.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2009)
(providing that margins can be included in a variety of ways, including adopting conservative
modeling assumptions). In its 1999 report, the NRC criticized common approaches to setting
margins of safety as "arbitrarily selected." TMIDL APPROACH, supra note 197, at 74.
205. The CAA does require margins of safety in the NAAQS, but those margins are
present to address uncertainties about health needs, not uncertainties about planning
outcomes. See supm note 82 and accompanying text.
206. HOUCK, supra note 191, at 108.
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The first, an unpublished decision by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington in
Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v Rasmussen,"' involved an industry
challenge to an allegedly overprotective TMDL. Citing the "margin of
safety" language, the court rejected the challenge. Its reasoning is not
entirely clear, but the court may have viewed that language as
insulating the EPA against charges that it was irrationally
overregulating."8 That may seem like a small point, but challenges
against alleged environmental overprotection are common," and some
environmental managers believe they cannot approve anything more
stringent than the most lenient plan that might succeed." ' Empowering
agencies to take a more cautious approach can therefore change
outcomes.
In the second case, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v
Muszynska environmental groups challenged the EPA's approval of a
New York State TMDL with an allegedly underprotective ten percent
margin of safety."' While NRDC argued that the ten percent margin
was inadequately explained and inconsistent with relevant guidance
and expert testimony, the EPA prevailed; both the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit concluded that the EPA had discretion to exercise professional
judgment in selecting the appropriate margin of safety."' That
outcome suggests that having a margin-of-safety requirement will not
always lead to a buffer that environmental advocates view as sufficient.
If the agency wants to select a thin margin of safety and can reasonably
explain that choice, courts probably will defer. Nevertheless, that New
York even included a margin of safety in its TMDL, and that New York
and the EPA provided explanations for its sufficiency, creates a striking
contrast with Environmental Defense v EPA, the CAA case previously
207. No. C.93-33D, 1993 WL 484888 (WD. Wash. Aug. 10, 1993), aff by
Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 E3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995). The appellate decision
does not discuss the margin of safety language.
208. Id. at *6, *8.
209. E.g., Fishermen's Dock Coop., Inc. v. Brown, 75 E3d 164 (4th Cir. 1996).
210. E.g., Fine & Owen, supm note 30, at 959; see also Rohlf, supra note 140, at 141-
42 (describing the Department of the Interior's policy of allocating the "cushion"--in other
words, deliberately giving away the margin of safety-to endangered species-impacting
projects).
211. 268E3d91 (2dCir.2001).
212. Id. at 102-03; NRDC v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
("[A]bsent more specific guidance from Congress-EPA is in the best position to determine,




discussed."3 There, the facts strongly suggest that New York's SIP
amendment contained no margin of safety. But because the CAA says
hardly anything about safety margins or success odds, the requisite
level of assurance escaped discussion and review."' In TMDL
approval processes, by contrast, such disappearance would be legally
suspect."' The states and the EPA must include and coherently explain
at least some margin, and those requirements should create incentives
toward developing TMDLs that are likely to succeed.
E Nuclear Wastd'
6
Nuclear waste policy exemplifies a somewhat different approach
to planning uncertainty. Planning again is critical, and planners must
confront significant unknowns."7  As in most other areas of
environmental law, Congress has provided little direct guidance about
how plans should manage uncertainties. But agencies and an unusual
participant-the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)--have
engaged the issue, and their discussions have produced a numeric
probability standard. The process of reaching that standard has been
far from ideal, and it illustrates some of the perils of developing
probability standards after a project is under consideration, rather than
trying to create a generally applicable standard in advance of particular
proposals. Nevertheless, the overall approach in some ways represents
an improvement over the hidden approaches used elsewhere, and it
illustrates some of the positive functions a regulatory probability
standard can serve.
Perhaps no area of environmental policy relies as heavily upon ex
ante planning as nuclear waste management. Some nuclear wastes
have long half-lives,"8 and consequently, as the D.C. Circuit recently
put it, "[r]adioactive waste and its harmful consequences persist for
time spans seemingly beyond human comprehension." 9  One
213. 369 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2004); see supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
215. See EPA, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS, supa note 204, ch.
3 (describing margin of safety selection as a standard step in the TMDL development
process).
216. From 2004 until 2007, I helped represent Nevada in its opposition to the Yucca
Mountain repository. Although this Part draws upon that experience, the points raised are my
own except where otherwise cited.
217. See generally UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE
NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE (Allison M. Macfarlane & Rodney C. Ewing eds.,
2006).
218. Id. at 6.
219. NEI v. EPA, 373 E3d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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therefore cannot reasonably assume that present social or political
institutions will survive long enough to adjust waste containment
systems, 20 and the selection of effective waste management strategies
instead depends upon modelers' predictive capacities.' Predictions of
plan success also have short-term consequences, for the nuclear
industry cannot function indefinitely without a plan for waste
management.2 2 Nuclear power's viability therefore may be partially
contingent upon our ability to generate waste management plans that
seem, based on current projections, highly likely to contain wastes for
millennia--or our willingness, for the sake of present benefit, to
accept plans with a substantial possibility of future failure.
Those policy choices have unfolded through a complex legal and
political process. In 1982, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (NWPA),223 which assigns the federal government responsibility
for managing the nation's high-level nuclear waste and directs the
Department of Energy (DOE) to select disposal sitesY.4  A site
selection process and subsequent legislation narrowed DOE's
evaluative focus to Yucca Mountain in Nevada,25 and in 2003, DOE
selected Nevada's Yucca Mountain as its site.226  DOE's decision
triggered an obligation for DOE to apply to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for an operating license, which DOE did in June,
2008.7 The application should specify measures, including
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 10101(9) (2006) (defining "disposal" as emplacement "with no
foreseeable intent of recovery"); COMM. ON TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN
STANDARDS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNICAL BASES FOR YUCCA MOUNTAIN
STANDARDS 8 (1995) [hereinafter TECHNICAL BASES].
221. See Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear
Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,066, 38,070 (Sept. 19,
1985) (codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 191) ("Standards must be implemented in the
design phase for these disposal systems because active surveillance cannot be relied upon
over such periods.").
222. Since 1977, the NRC has asserted that "it would not continue to license reactors
if it did not have reasonable confidence that the waste can and will in due course be disposed
of safely." Thomas A. Cotton, Nuclear Waste Story. Setting the Stage, in UNCERTAINTY
UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra
note 217, at 31 (internal quotations omitted).
223. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10,101-10,270 (2006)).
224. 42 U.S.C. § 10,132; see NEI, 373 E3d at 1258-59; NRDC v. EPA, 824 E2d 1258,
1262-63 (1 st Cir. 1987) (describing the process originally set out by the NWPA).
225. NE, 373 E3d at 1260; see Robert J. Cynkar, Dumping on Federalism, 75 U.
COLO. L. REv. 1261, 1271 (2004).
226. NEI,373F.3dat 1260-61.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 10,134; Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep't of
Energy, Repository Licensing Overview, http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/factsheets/
doeymp0 11.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
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engineering controls and geologic containment systems that the DOE
will rely upon to isolate the waste. Though not labeled as such, the
application is basically a waste containment plan.228 In evaluating that
plan, the NRC will act much like the EPA when it reviews a state's SIP
or NOAA Fisheries when it reviews a fishery management plan.
Using modeled simulations of the plan's performance, the NRC will
determine whether the plan will assure compliance with health and
safety standards developed by the EPA and by the NRC itself
922
Just as with fisheries and air quality planning, the performance of
a nuclear waste disposal system cannot be predicted with certainty-
except, of course, if a system would be sure to fail.20 Predicting the
course of human events for the next million years is impossible, and in
order to even perform an analysis, simplifying assumptions are
unavoidable. 3' Many of the DOE's proposed engineering controls are
novel and lack natural analogs, and while there is general agreement
that the engineered systems eventually will fail, estimates of the timing
of that failure vary widely.32  The performance of a natural
containment system is somewhat easier to predict; unlike engineers,
geologists and climatologists can draw upon the past in predicting the
future, and in those fields predictions spanning thousands of years are
common.233  Nevertheless, climate changes, volcanic activity,
earthquakes, and other variables complicate efforts to predict future
outcomes, as can incomplete understanding of a site's geology and
228. See Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt., Dep't of Energy, Elements of
the License Application, http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/fact/contents-of the license_
application.shtml (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (explaining the contents of the license
application). The license application is available online. NRC, DOE's License Application
for a High-Level Waste Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/
hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
229. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2776,
2921-23 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10,141); Chris Whipple, Performance
Assessment What Is It and Why Is It Done, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA
MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supr note 217, at 57-70.
230. See TECHNICAL BASES, supra note 220, at 1 ("[A]ssessments of repository
performance must contend with substantial uncertainties...."). See generally John Lemons,
Uncertainties in the Disposal ofHigh-Level Nuclear Waste, in SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 111, at 55; UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND:
YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 217.
231. See TECHNICAL BASES, supra note 220, at 9-11.
232. See Allison C. Macfarlane, Technical Policy Decision Making in Siting a fHgh-
Level Nuclear Waste Repository, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND
THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 217, at 89.
233. See TECHNICAL BASES, supra note 220, at 9.
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hydrology."' The models themselves add additional uncertainty, for
their complexity minimizes transparency and can mask design flaws. "
Despite these uncertainties, predicting site performance is more than
guesswork. For Yucca Mountain, at least, the NAS has concluded that
the natural and engineering uncertainties, though real, are analytically
manageable, and that system performance can plausibly be assessed
over hundreds of thousands of years.236 But modelers will not be able
to precisely predict future exposure to radioactive releases from the
site, and instead will use Monte Carlo analyses to predict a range of
possible outcomes." ' Someone therefore must decide how to compare
those outcomes to the safety standard. Depending upon the leniency
of the standard and the final predictions of the models (and, of course,
congressional and presidential decisions), that choice could prove
outcome-determinative.238
As in most other areas of environmental law, Congress has
provided little guidance on probability standards. The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (AEA), which ushered in the era of nuclear regulation,
simply instructs the Atomic Energy Commission to promote nuclear
power while providing the public with "adequate protection"--a term
the AEA did not define.239 The NWPA, though centrally focused upon
waste management, is only slightly less open-ended. The NWPA
demands "reasonable assurance that the public and the environment
will be adequately protected from the hazards posed by high-level
radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in
a repository.'24°  In demanding "reasonable assurance," Congress
invoked a term of art; the NRC had traditionally required that licensees
234. See Whipple, supa note 229, at 62-67; Lemons, supa note 230, at 59-64. See
geneially UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL
NUCLEAR WASTE, s/pra note 217, at 105-282. The uncertainties at Yucca Mountain are
compounded by the uniqueness of the site. Most other countries are proposing to dispose
their nuclear waste below the water table. Macfarlane, supra note 232, at 87. Yucca
Mountain therefore cannot easily be compared to other proposed repositories.
235. Whipple, supra note 229, at 64-67.
236. See TECHNICAL BASES, supia note 220, at 1, 9. But see NEI v. EPA, 373 E3d
1251, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting EPA's disagreement with this conclusion).
237. Whipple, supa note 229, at 60, 65. For an explanation of Monte Carlo analyses,
see generally Susan R. Poulter, Monte Carlo Simulation hn Environmental Risk
Assessment-Science, Policy andLegal Issues, 9 RISK 7 (1998).
238. See Whipple, supra note 229, at 61, reproducing a chart, which a DOE contractor
created in 2001, showing predicted performance as a function of time. The differences
among the fifth percentile, median, mean, and ninety-fifth percentile are substantial.
239. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, § 182(a), 68 Stat. 919, 954
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2006)); see Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory
Reform and the RevivalofNuclearPower, 20 HOFsTRA L. REv. 159, 162 (1991).
240. 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b)(1).
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provide "reasonable assurance" that public health and safety would be
protected."' Nevertheless, that term of art is not much clearer than
"adequate protection"--it signals that absolute assurance is not
necessary, but otherwise invites but does not substantially constrain
regulatory judgment. 2 Consequently, neither statutes nor the NRC's
traditional standards say whether the NRC should use a ninety-five
percent confidence interval, the median, the mean, some other numeric
measure, or a qualitative standard more specific than "reasonable
assurance."
While Congress provided little guidance about the requisite level
of assurance, the Energy Policy Act of 1992 prescribed a specific
process for developing the health and safety standards against which
Yucca Mountain would be evaluated.4 That process, in combination
with ongoing EPA deliberations, in turn allowed a dialogue about the
appropriate treatment of plan uncertainty. "  Rather than simply asking
the EPA and the NRC to generate standards, Congress directed the
NAS to prepare recommendations on the technical bases for the Yucca
Mountain standards, and ordered the EPA to generate standards "based
241. See Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 367
U.S. 396, 406-07 (1961); Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic
Repositories Technical Criteria, 48 Fed. Reg. 28,194, 28,202, 28,204 (June 21, 1983)
(codified as amended at 10 C.F.R. pt. 64).
242. The NRC has sometimes suggested that "reasonable assurance" is a highly
protective standard, which requires not just that applicants demonstrate compliance with
relevant numeric standards but also that their demonstration pass a supplemental qualitative
judgment test. Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories
Technical Criteria, 48 Fed. Reg. at 28,202, 28,204. The NRC has declined to affix any
particular percentage to the reasonable assurance concept, however, and its definition of the
concept deliberately leaves substantial flexibility for discretionary judgment. See id.
243. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2776, 2921-23
(1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10,141 (2006)).
244. Before enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the EPA already had created
numeric standards for both containment of and exposure to nuclear waste. It also established
secondary probability standards, both qualitative and quantitative, which specified the
requisite likelihood of achieving compliance with the containment and exposure standards.
Environmental Standards for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-
Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,066, 38,085 (Sept. 19, 1985)
(codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 91). In some standards, the EPA specified required
percentage assurances that particular values would not be exceeded. See 40 C.ER. § 191.13
(2008). However, for other measures, it recommended using a "best estimate," which it
described as "the mean or the median of the appropriate distribution, whichever is higher."
Id § 191 app. B, 50 Fed. Reg. at 38,088. The EPA's overarching qualitative standard required
a "reasonable expectation" which the EPA described as somewhat less stringent than a
"reasonable assurance" of compliance with the numeric probability standards. 50 Fed. Reg.
at 38,076. The EPA also required "assurance" measures, which it described as supplemental
controls to account for uncertainties in the numeric predictions. See 40 C.ER. § 191.14; 50
Fed. Reg. at 38,079.
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upon and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences., 24 In 1995, the NAS completed its
study, which, among many other recommendations, identified the
mean as the appropriate probability standard.
24 6
That recommendation became significant when, after a series of
failed rulemaking efforts, the EPA proposed a different approach.247 In
a 2005 draft rule, the EPA proposed to select the mean as a pre- 10,000
year measure and the median, which could be a dramatically lower
number 148 and therefore would effectively create a more permissive
standard, as its longer-term measure. 249 A vigorous dialogue ensued,
with many comments contesting that proposal2"° and public reports
considering its viability.25' In its final rulemaking, the EPA abandoned
the median and returned to the mean as its sole probability standard.
That process leaves something to be desired. Ideally, the
selection of probability standards-and other aspects of a safety
standard-would precede the selection of a specific site to be
evaluated. Once a particular site is chosen, political pressure naturally
will build to make the evaluative system fit the site rather than the
245. Energy Policy Act § 10,141.
246. TECHNICAL BASES, supm note 220, at 123.
247. The EPA generated its first standard in the 1980s, and, on other grounds, several
petitioners successfully challenged the EPA's rule. NRDC v. EPA, 824 E2d 1258 (1st Cir.
1987). In 2001, after Yucca Mountain became the DOE's primary focus and Congress had
enacted the Energy Policy Act, the EPA tried again. Public Health and Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain, N, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,074 (June 13, 2001)
(codified as amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 197). This time, it selected the arithmetic mean as its
probability standard, meaning that average predicted future exposure levels or environmental
concentrations would be compared to the relevant standards. Id at 32,125. That rule also
was set aside, again on other grounds, setting the stage for the 2005 proposed rule. NEI v.
EPA, 373 E3d 1251, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
248. THE KEYSTONE CTR., NUCLEAR POWER JOINT FACT-F1NDNG 71 (2007) (noting that
the mean "could be 3 or more times higher" than the median). The difference exists because
the modeling projections do not produce a classic "normal distribution." Instead, the
projections show some resemblance to a "power law" distribution, which includes more high
values than a bell curve. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly:
Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 145 (2003).
249. Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca
Mountain, N, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,014, 49,041-46 (proposed Aug. 22, 2005) (to be codified at
40 C.ER. pt. 197).
250. See Office of Radiation & Indoor Air, Response to Comments, Amendments to
the Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Mountain,
Nevada 201-19, http://www.epa.gov/rpdweb0O/docs/yucca/rtc-document-final.pdf (last
visited Sept. 7, 2009) (providing comments on the mean/median choice and the EPA's
responses to those comments).
251. THE KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 248, at 71.
252. Public Health and Environmental Radiation Standards for Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,256, 61,261 (Oct. 15, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pt. 197).
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underlying public safety goal. 2 3  Instead, a combination of
Congressiona! intervention, agency choices, and litigation outcomes
delayed finalization of the safety standards, leaving the EPA to
generate those safety standards in full awareness that they could be
outcome determinative, not only for Yucca Mountain,254 but also for a
nuclear revival,"' for the NRC's and the DOE's continued bureaucratic
importance, "6 and for the federal treasury.2 ' Also, ideally the dialogue
surrounding that choice would be consistently robust and informed,
and would involve participants relying on their core areas of expertise.
Here, however, Congress delegated a mixture of science and policy
questions to the NAS, 8 which then provided, with hardly any
explanation, a policy-laden recommendation for a probability
standard.2 " The EPA, which theoretically has more policy expertise
than the NAS, disputed that recommendation primarily on flawed
253. See William M. Murphy, Regulating the Geologic Disposal of High-Level
Nuclear Waste at Yucca Mountain, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND
THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 217, at 53 ("With only one site to
regulate, the standards and regulations were adapted to the unique characteristics of Yucca
Mountain"); THE KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 248, at 69 (noting that the elimination of
alternative sites from consideration "led to concerns that the federal government would find
Yucca Mountain suitable even if it failed to meet acceptable criteria").
254. See Whipple, supmanote 229.
255. See Roland M. Frye, Jr., The Current 'Nuclear Renaissance" in the United States,
Its Underlying Reasons, and Its Potential Pitfalls, 29 ENERGY L.J. 279, 356 (2008) ("[U]ntil
the country resolves the spent fuel management issue, it will hinder the development of
nuclear energy in the United States.").
256. A license denial for Yucca Mountain would not necessarily signal the end for
geologic disposal. In theory, it would indicate only that Yucca Mountain is not the right site.
Similarly, an approval at Yucca Mountain would represent only a temporary solution, and one
useful only for this country. Unless technological advances significantly reduce waste
volumes, other disposal sites still will be necessary. SeeTHE KEYSTONE CTR., supa note 248,
at 72 ("Any net expansion of U.S. nuclear power generation would require significantly
greater repository capacity than currently established by law for the Yucca Mountain site.").
But see Joshua Boak, Cost Slows Nuclear Plant Drive: Tab Has Doubled in Past Year as
Uncertainties Rise, CmI. TRam., May 7, 2008, § 3, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.
com/2008/May/07/business/Chi-wed-nuclear-energy-debate-MayO7 ("If we had all this
trouble over one Yucca Mountain, do we really want to have this problem over 10 [of them]?"
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
257. See Cotton, supra note 222, at 37 (explaining the financial pressures on the
federal government); Matthew L. Wald, US. Decides One Nuclear Dump Is Enough, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at Al (observing that even without additional delays, "the government
will owe commercial damages to the utilities of $11 billion or more").
258. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 801, 106 Stat. 2776,
2921-23 (1992) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 10141 (2006)).
259. The NAS's entire discussion of the subject is as follows: "We recommend that
the mean values of calculations be the basis for comparison with our recommended
standards." TECHNICAL BASES, supra note 220, at 123.
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technical grounds."° Even as administrative dialogues go, this has
been no shining example of deliberative democracy.
Nevertheless, while this process may not be ideal, the EPA did at
least set forth options and rationales, the ensuing dialogue affected
outcomes, and the end result is a real standard. That distinguishes
nuclear waste management from the other areas of environmental law,
where statutes and regulations have done little to constrain probability
standards and agencies typically make their choices on an ad hoc basis.
That flexibility can become rather problematic if, as often happens, the
agency's staff is pressured to approve plans with slim success odds.
Because Yucca Mountain will be evaluated against such a probability
standard, there is more transparency," ' the foundations of a public
debate,262 and the possibility of some degree of accountability if
inappropriate factors enter the decisionmaking. That does not mean
that the numerical standard is a panacea; numbers can create a false
sense of certainty, and some scientists have questioned the utility of
quantitative predictions for Yucca Mountain.263 But in an otherwise
highly politicized process, those requirements ensure that not just any
superficially credible proposal can be approved."6
260. The EPA initially argued that the median would be less likely to be skewed by the
results of harmful but improbable scenarios. However, in a probabilistic risk assessment, a
Monte Carlo analysis does not give extra weight to extreme values; each individual run
represents a combination of circumstances with an equal chance of occurring (if the data and
assumptions are correct, which of course they never entirely are), and the mean of all of those
outcomes should not disproportionately weight any individual run. See Poulter, supra note
237, at 11 ("[B]ecause the methods provide probability distributions of exposure or risk, they
avoid the problems of compounding conservative values of input variables.").
261. See Whipple, supm note 229, at 67 ("[O]ne of the most important purposes
served by [DOE's modeling approach] is the disclosure of the assumptions, models, and
analytic methods underlying the project staff's understanding of the repository system.").
262. In developing its 2001 rule, which the D.C. Circuit set aside, and again in its 2005
proposed rule, the EPA outlined alternative possible approaches, explained its view of their
merits or weaknesses, and invited comment on those approaches; many of the resulting
comments were substantive. Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Yucca Mountain, N, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,091 (June 13, 2001) (codified as
amended at 40 C.ER. pt. 197); Public Health and Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Yucca Mountain, N, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,033-34, 49,041-46 (proposed Aug. 22,
2005) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pt. 197).
263. E.g., Rodney C. Ewing, Performance Assessments.- Are They Necessary or
Sufflcient, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MouNTAiN AND THE NATION'S HIGH-
LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE, supra note 217, at 81; Macfarlane, supra note 232, at 92-94
(describing objections to numeric standards).
264. See Macfarlane, supra note 232, at 87 ("[S]trong political pressure exists ... to




The foregoing examples demonstrate that problems of planning
uncertainty pervade first-generation environmental laws, and that
those laws provide sparse and uneven guidance about how those
problems should be resolved. Those laws' emphasis on planning is
well documented, and commentators frequently note that
environmental instabilities and uncertainties were not as well
appreciated during the 1960s and 1970s as they are now.2 65 But the
problems are not just relics of a past age. As Congress and
environmental agencies-and, in all likelihood, international bodies-
take on new environmental challenges, similar issues will likely recur,
and those issues will likely be particularly salient for any sort of legal
response to climate change.
Even in the absence of major new federal legislation, that
salience may result from new applications of older environmental
laws. Climate change already has triggered threatened species
listings,26' created water quality threats 6 ' and been a central issue in
NEPA litigation."8 If a "nuclear renaissance" becomes part of a
strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the plan uncertainty
issues associated with nuclear waste disposal will assume greater
importance." Perhaps most importantly, listing greenhouse gases as
pollutants could trigger obligations to address greenhouse gases
through the CANs planning provisions."' Even if the United States
265. E.g., Fine & Owen, supm note 30, at 909-10; Tarlock, supra note 29, at 1122-23;
Jonathon Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F 1, 2
(1996).
266. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Buildng
Bridges to the No-AnalogFuture, 88 B.U.L. REv. 1, 5-6 & n.12 (2008).
267. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, PETITION FOR REVISED PH WATER QUALrY
CRITERIA UNDER SECTION 30 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT, 33 U.S.C. § 1314, To ADDRESS
OCEAN ACIDIFICATION (2007), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/oceans/pdfs/
section-304-petition-12-18-07.pdf.
268. E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538
E3d 1172, 1215-17 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate
change is precisely the kind of cumulative impacts analysis that NEPA requires agencies to
conduct."); see Int'l Ctr. for Tech. Assessment et al., Petition Requesting that the Council on
Environmental Quality Amend Its Regulations To Clarify that Climate Change Analyses Be
Included in Environmental Review Documents (Feb. 28, 2008).
269. See Frye, supra note 255, at 282-88 (describing increasing interest in nuclear
power).
270. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-35 (2007) (holding that carbon dioxide is a
"pollutant," and thus triggering the obligation, if the EPA determines that C02 endangers
public health or welfare, to regulate C02 emissions under multiple provisions of the CAA);
EPA, Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (to
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relies primarily upon existing laws to address climate change, the
effectiveness of its response will depend heavily upon approaches to
managing planning uncertainty.
New climate change legislation is likely to repeat some of that
emphasis on planning. Almost any comprehensive climate change
legislation or treaty is likely to create a specific numeric target-for
example, that by 2050 greenhouse gas emissions will be less than
seventeen percent of 2005 levels271-and to either directly propose or
task the EPA with developing measures to achieve that goal.272
Whether the measures involve a cap and trade system, technology-
based controls, carbon taxes, research and development subsidies,
some other regulatory instrument, or a combination of approaches,
those measures will collectively function as a plan for achieving the
target, just as a SIP functions as a plan for achieving the NAAQS.
That planning also will likely occur at multiple scales. Individual
measures, like carbon offsetting trades, will likely function as plans
within the larger plan.273
The success of these plans will not be certain.2 4  Economic
predictions, projections of future technological development, and
estimates of the enforceability of legal controls all are likely to contain
significant levels of uncertainty. Even a cap and trade system, which
theoretically offers the promise of a predefined emissions-reduction
outcome, will in practice face unknowns."' Because so many
sources contribute greenhouse gas emissions, including all in the cap
be codified at 40 C.ER. ch. 7) (issuing an endangerment finding pursuant to the parallel
language of Clean Air Act section 202).
271. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2998, 11 1th Cong. § 702
(1st Sess. 2009).
272. See Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate
Change Legislative Proposal Is "Best", 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 123, 127-29 (2007)
(describing legislative proposals); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation:
Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 712-13 (1999) (describing the Kyoto
Protocol, which uses a mandatory cap approach and leaves signatory nations to develop plans
to comply with that cap).
273. SeeH.R. 2998, § 722(d)(1) (allowing offsets).
274. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater Why the
Clean Air Act. Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global
Warming, 50 Aiuz. L. REv. 799, 809-16 (2008) (explaining some weaknesses of cap-and-
trade approaches).
275. See Wiener, supra note 272, at 727-34 (contrasting cap-based and tax-based
regulatory systems).
276. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Lessons Learned from the European Union's
Emissions Trading Scheme and the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism 6
(2008) (noting that even after several years of implementation, the European Union's
emissions trading system's "effects on emissions are uncertain").
312 [Vol. 84:265
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W
and trade system may be infeasible.277  Estimating emissions from
some sources or absorption from some carbon sinks-for example,
from forestry or agricultural activities-also cannot be done with
anything approaching perfect accuracy or precision, and overly
211optimistic estimates could easily thwart achievement of the cap.
Even for sources included in the cap and trade system and amenable to
precise and accurate quantification, compliance failures are always a
possibility, particularly if monitoring and enforcement systems are not
robust.279
Consequently, the effectiveness of any legal response to climate
change will depend partly on responses to several layers of planning
uncertainty. Lawmakers will need to decide not only how to address
the risk that the overall plan will not obtain its targets, but also how to
manage the risk that individual components of that overall strategy will
not produce planned outcomes. Ideally their response will not rest
solely on ex ante attempts to manage plan uncertainty; monitoring,
enforcement, and adjustment also are likely to be essential.28 ° Other
nonplanning regulatory mechanisms, like efficiency standards and
incentives for technological development, can provide insurance in
case planning approaches fail to achieve their goals. But some
proactive management of plan uncertainty will be an essential
component of a successful regulatory approach.
III. REFORMING EXISTING APPROACHES
The preceding section demonstrates that challenges of planning
uncertainty pervade environmental law and that management of those
challenges has important consequences. The issue cuts across statutes
and environmental media, with significant implications wherever it
arises, and will likely continue to confront Congress and agencies as
they grapple with climate change and other future environmental
problems. The section also demonstrates that approaches to these
problems vary. But several themes emerge. First, in most contexts,
legislators have not prescribed and agencies have not developed clear
and systematic approaches to those problems. Statutes and regulations
277. See Flatt, supm note 272, at 136-37; Wiener, supra note 272, at 692 ("In every
country, virtually every human activity directly or indirectly emits GHGs.....
278. See Flatt, supm note 272, at 142-44.
279. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 276, at 7-8 (describing
challenges associated with the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism).
280. See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing arguments in favor of adaptive
management).
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provide some direction, but it generally is uneven and usually is vague.
Second, where meaningful constraints do exist, lawmakers still have
often taken moderately indulgent attitudes towards failure risk. Thus,
while these questions are important and pervasive, legal responses
have tended to be ad hoc and risk-tolerant.
Are these conclusions cause for concern? There are several
reasons why one might think not. To those who think environmental
laws are excessively ambitious, plans that accept increased failure risk
as the price for reduced regulatory stringency might seem like
desirable regulatory relief.28' To environmental laws' proponents,
indulgence toward uncertain plans might seem like a pressure-release
valve, allowing slippage where full implementation might galvanize
political frustration and jeopardize the survival of the laws
themselves.282 Legislation and generalized regulations are far from
perfect, "3 and ad hoc decisionmaking might ameliorate legislators' and
rulemakers' worst excesses and reduce the problems inherent in
applying any broadly applicable law.2" If one is skeptical, as some
environmental scholars are, about the value of any ex ante prediction,
attempting to enforce more stringent standards for plan certainty might
seem like a quixotic exercise or an invitation to manipulate predictive
models. 5 Consequently, one might wonder if there will be any real
differences between a system involving generally applicable
probability standards and one in which agencies simply find their way
on a decision-by-decision basis. Even if such differences might exist,
they might not seem problematic.
There are plausible bases for all of these concerns, but in this Part
I explain why existing approaches to planning uncertainty can and
should be reformed. The improvements should involve developing
more systematic standards for planning uncertainty; creating those
standards through legislative or rule-making processes rather than
281. See, e.g., Farber, supm note 28, at 301-03 (describing the EPA's reluctance to
implement programs it felt were overly strict). See generally John P. Dwyer, The Pathology
of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990) (criticizing overly ambitious laws
enacted primarily for their political symbolism).
282. See, e.g., Doremus, supm note 154, at 61 (explaining the willingness of FWS and
NMFS to "give up the possibility of strong protection" to preserve the ESA's political
viability).
283. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAI/DIRTY
AIR (1981) (describing the enactment of the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments); Dwyer, supm
note 281.
284. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 957 (1995).
285. See, e.g., ORRN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS, USELESS ARITHMETIC: WHY
ENvitoNMENrAL SCIENTISTS CAN'T PREDICr THE FUTURE 22-44 (2007).
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through ad hoc adjudicative or occasional judicial decisions; and, in
most circumstances, ensuring that those standards are more stringent
than present approaches. I make these claims for several reasons, each
explored in more detail below.
A. The Trouble with AdHoc Resolutions
As numerous commentators have pointed out, our system of
environmental law often delegates policy choices away from policy
realms and asks scientific experts to resolve hidden questions of
value.286 A common consequence of that tendency is political and
regulatory dysfunction. Agency scientists try to shoehorn
nontechnical questions, which they may have no distinctive
qualification to resolve, into technical modes of analysis.287 Important
value questions fade from public view, impeding outside participation
and accountability.288 Problematic outcomes may be misdiagnosed as
products of bad science or flawed technical decisionmaking rather than
as the results of policy choices, leading lawmakers to miss
opportunities to improve the underlying legal scheme.289
Existing ad hoc approaches to setting probability standards
exemplify this problem of hidden policy determinations. Those
approaches can remove plan uncertainty questions--questions that
raise almost pure policy issues-from traditional policy-making
spheres, undermining transparency, accountability, and public and
legislative understanding of environmental policy choices. While the
consequences of relocating decisions will not be uniform, there are
multiple reasons to expect that ad hoc decisionmaking will often
produce less protective plans.
1. Transparency
The selection of a probability standard is clearly a policy choice.
Scientific or economic research can help estimate the odds of
compliance, given a certain set of planning provisions, and can help
286. See Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1033-35 (1997); Wagner,
supra note 19, at 183-86, 205-13.
287. See Doremus, supm note 286, at 1035 ("In effect, Congress has forced the listing
agencies into a 'science charade,' in which they must pretend to make nonscientific decisions
entirely on the basis of science. The result is an inconsistent, incoherent listing program."
(footnote omitted) (quoting Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk
Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. Ruv. 1613 (1995))).
288. SeeFine & Owen, supra note 30, at 930-34; Wagner, supm note 19, at 264-66.
289. SeeWagner, supra note 19, at 258.
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explain the consequences of plan failures. But science cannot
determine what plan success odds are appropriate. Those questions
instead implicate nonscientific determinations about the appropriate
strength of societal commitments to environmental protection.
In many contexts, those policy questions are environmentally and
economically important. A probability standard demanding
compliance with a statutory mandate fifty percent of the time-or, in
qualitative terms, more often than not-will compel fundamentally
different planning schemes than a standard requiring an eighty percent
success rate, or than a standard tolerant of any plan with some
possibility of success. Demanding a higher success rate means
preferring extra environmental protection over errors of insufficient
protection, with positive consequences for environmental quality but
potentially negative consequences for compliance costs. Conversely, a
standard allowing a lower success rate prioritizes avoiding perceived
overregulation over avoiding noncompliance with environmental
standards.29 The resulting differences in costs and environmental
outcomes could be substantial."' Anyone who cares about balancing
environmental quality against compliance costs-and most
participants in environmental debates care about that balancing-
should be concerned about that choice.
In the absence of statutory or regulatory probability standards,
however, those choices can disappear from public view."' With no
obligation to meet a standard, planners may not discuss confidence
levels at all, instead presenting their predictions without any disclosure
of error ranges. SIP approval documents exemplify this problem;
discerning from those documents what level of failure risk the EPA
and the states have accepted is often nearly impossible.293 That opacity
is not inevitable. Even before probability standards existed, NOAA
Fisheries scientists provided probability estimates to fishery
management councils,9 4 and at least a qualitative estimate is usually
290. To state a standard is not to ensure compliance, of course, but if there is any
correlation between the standard and the actual plan, then a stringent probability standard will
mean more protective measures, different environmental outcomes, and different costs.
291. SeeFigure 1.
292. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 133 (1991) ("Former EPA
Administrator Douglas Costle has noted that '[tihat which can be measured tends to receive
more weight than less tangible, though perhaps more important effects which cannot be
quantified."'); Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 930-34.
293. See discussion supm Part I.B.




possible-but generally, it takes a requirement to spur a discussion.
Consequently, outsiders may have no basis for discovering, let alone
evaluating, the agency's approach to plan uncertainty.
95
Nor is the problem unique to outsiders. Even internal agency
personnel may not understand their agency's approach, or may
deliberately avoid confronting it. Planners without technical
background or knowledge may consider uncertainty management a
question for the modelers, whose results they will simply and
conveniently accept as firm predictions regardless of the underlying
uncertainties.296 Without a probability standard signaling the need for
such information, technical staff members who do understand the
uncertainty choices at stake may choose not to explain them. They
may fear their explanations will be misinterpreted as confessions that
their work was inadequate297 or may believe, as many scientists do, that
policy makers and lawyers have no interest in hearing about
uncertainties. 298 Again, the fisheries example illustrates that such
disappearance does not always occur. But it is at least plausible to
expect that the absence of a probability standard will mean an
associated absence of anything more than an exceedingly general and
uninformative acknowledgement of failure risk.9
Even if planners do document their approach, the absence of
generalized probability standards can move the resulting discussion to
a less accessible forum. While in almost any forum, regulated entities
tend to participate more extensively than regulatory beneficiaries,"
legislative or rulemaking processes are somewhat more accessible to
outside participants with limited funds, limited time, or limited expert
295. See supm notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
296. E.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 930 & n.143, 956 n.286 (describing
modelers' perceptions that nontechnical policy makers had no interest in hearing about
potential uncertainties); Wagner, supra note 19, at 221-57 (explaining reasons why Congress
may be uninterested in learning about scientific uncertainties, or unable to do so). While
Wagner focuses on Congress, much of her analysis could apply equally to politically savvy
agency employees.
297. See McGARITy, supra note 292, at 134-35 ("If analysts forthrightly confront the
uncertainties inherent in their predictions and make the decisionmaker aware of the general
lack of confidence with which they speak, they risk rejection."); Wagner, supra note 19, at
238-45.
298. See Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 930 & n.143, 957 n.286. In informal
conversations with environmental scientists, I have often heard somewhat similar assertions,
many grounded in the fallacious but seemingly widely held notion that law cannot
accommodate uncertain answers from scientists.
299. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.B (discussing air quality management).
300. Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability and Regulatory
Metrics, 86 TEx. L. REv. 1741, 1751-56 (2008).
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resources. While these participants rarely have the capacity to
participate in hundreds of plan-by-plan choices about uncertainty risk,
particularly where understanding those choices requires technical
sophistication, they are more likely to be able to weigh in if the agency
sets a generalized policy through a single consolidated notice and
comment rulemaking.30 ' Regulated interests, by contrast, often have
greater financial resources and more sharply defined motivations, and
are often more able to participate in diffused, ad hoc decisionmaking
processes.
Such opacity and skewed participation create problems. Our
environmental law system is premised upon widely shared notions that
allowing at least the possibility of participation is democratically
important, and that technocratic decisionmaking, though necessary,
ought to be tempered by dialogue among nontechnical policymakers
and interested members of the public.3 That system's emphasis on
participation also reflects awareness that outside participants can
supplement the often minimal information base and homogenous
perspectives upon which agency decisionmakers rely."° Transparency
and accountability are directly connected; it is more difficult for
agencies to premise plan choices on poorly reasoned rationales, or on
reasons at odds with statutory directives, if their reasoning must be
explained. 5  Participation and outside review also have their
detractors, of course, and legal literature is filled with warnings about
obstructionist participation.3 6 But ample experimental and anecdotal
301. See, e.g., EAGLE ETAL., supra note 55, at 34-35 (describing difficulties created by
diffused fisheries decisionmaking); Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science,
Adaptive Regulation, and the Problem of Rulemalang RutS 86 TEX. L. REv. 1701, 1726-28
(2008) (describing greater environmental participation in the centralized, high visibility
process of setting NAAQS); Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 951-52, 967-68 (discussing
challenges faced by public participants). I also base this assertion on my own experience
representing and working with public interest environmental groups.
302. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 84; Latin, supra note 81, at 1673-75; Shapiro &
Steinzor, supra note 300, at 1755 ("Regulated industries are especially likely to have
disproportionate influence when regulatory proposals are of low political salience and high
technological complexity.").
303. Fine & Owen, supa note 30, at 916-19.
304. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DuKE
L.J. 795, 895 (2005); Anne E. Simon, Valuing Public Participation, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 757,
760 (1999); Thomas C. Beierle & Jerry Cayford, Environmental Decision Making: What
Does Public ParticipationAddI 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Feb. 7,2003, at 15-16.
305. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43-44 (1983) (explaining that a flawed explanation for an agency's action is grounds for
setting that action aside).
306. E.g., Freeman & Farber, supia note 304, at 895 ("[T]he inspirational stories of
breakthroughs due to stakeholder initiative are frequently enough balanced by more
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evidence, as well as common sense, suggest that integrating a wider
variety of perspectives into decisionmaking processes can improve
outcomes."7 That evidence suggests that for the sake of promoting
democratic and informed decisionmaking, probability standards, and
the discussions they necessitate, are important.
2. Biases and Skewed Outcomes
A desire for transparency is an important reason to favor
generalized probability standards over present ad hoc approaches, but
it is not the only reason. Generalized probability standards also are
likely to lead to more careful approaches to plan uncertainty. That is
because systematic processes can reduce, though by no means
eliminate, some of the decisionmaking biases inherent in ad hoc
approaches.
a. Optimism
As both experimental and empirical evidence repeatedly indicate,
people tend to approach environmental uncertainty with excessive
optimism.'°8 Confronted with uncertain future resource availability or
with unknown risk, people tend to assume the best, thinking that
outcomes will likely be at the more desirable end of the range of
possibilities." People also tend to assume that they will exercise more
control than is actually likely, and thus overestimate their capacity to
depressing accounts of breakdowns, or of less than noble participation . ... "); J.B. Ruhl,
Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 21, 46-53
(2005) (blaming interest groups and their lawsuits for struggles implementing the ESA's HCP
program); Richard B. Stewart, Madlson'sNigbnare, 57 U. CHI. L. RE. 335,340-42 (1990).
307. E.g., EAGLE ETAL. supra note 55, at 2, 27 (describing problems with the absence
of public interest group representatives from regional fishery management councils);
Camacho, supra note 126, at 318 ("[Iln HCP processes in which the applicants... voluntarily
opened up the negotiations to stakeholders, the instrumental value of such participation has
been impressive").
308. See Robert T. Clemen, Improving and Measuring the Effectiveness of Decision
Analysis: Linking Decision Analysis and Behavioral Decision Research, in DECISION
MODELING AND BEHAVIOR IN COMPLEX AND UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENTS 6 (Tamar Kugler et
al. eds., 2008) ("Overconfidence is one of the most persistent biases that decision analysts
face."); LEE, supra note 32, at 151 (describing the "systematic tendency to overestimate the
likelihood that plans will succeed"); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The
Obstacles To Governing the Commons, 30 ENvTL. L. 241, 258, 264 (2000) (noting the
human tendency, in contexts of uncertainty, toward "tremendous wishful thinking:' and citing
studies).
309. See Thompson, supra note 308, at 258-59; Eagle & Thompson, supra note 30, at
671-72 (describing the effects of optimism upon fishery management decisions).
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produce desirable outcomes.31 Those tendencies have significant
implications for plans approved in contexts of uncertainty. Planners,
even if unaffected by outside pressure, will likely overestimate the
effectiveness of their plans, both because they underestimate potential
complications and adverse circumstances and because they
overestimate their own degree of control.
Outside pressures can exacerbate such false optimism. If
optimism leads to less stringent regulation or plans more permissive of
resource exploitation, regulated parties are likely to be pleased.
Regulatory beneficiaries may react with heightened opposition, but
they typically have less capacity to engage and critique decisions,
particularly if levels of plan certainty are being chosen in many
different decisions rather than a few consolidated processes."'
Optimism therefore has not only psychological predispositions but also
political leverage at its back. The common consequence, not
surprisingly, is what a FWS scientist involved in the Pacific
Northwest's spotted owl controversies once described as "considerable
... political pressure to create a plan which was an absolute minimum.
That is, which had a very low probability of success and which had a
minimum impact" upon regulated parties."2 Faced with such pressure,
any normal person will be inclined toward the path of least resistance.
Creating generalized probability standards does not necessarily
fix those problems, for agency staff may use the same rose-tinted
lenses to assess a plan's probability odds that it otherwise would use in
making ad hoc, standardless judgments of plan adequacy.3"3 But the
presence of uncertainty standards can dampen optimism bias. Where a
standard exists, some internal inquiry about whether the standard has
been achieved becomes necessary, and that inquiry can reveal
310. See Thompson, supra note 308, at 264-65 ("[W]hen confronted by an uncertain
future, most people assume that they will be able to avoid, reduce, or ameliorate future
risks.").
311. See supra notes 300-302 and accompanying text.
312. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 E Supp. 1081, 1089 (WD. Wash.), aff,
952 E2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); seealsoEAGLE ETAL., supmrnote 55, at 1-2 ("One of the easiest
ways to reduce the pain of allocating a catch, in short, is to raise the size of the catch-to the
detriment of conservation."); HOUCK, supra note 191, at 84, 102-03, 143-44 (describing
similar pressures upon agency staff responsible for TMDLs); Doremus, supra note 153, at
1606 (describing pressure imposed by a political appointee within the Fish and Wildlife
Service).
313. See JOHN S. HAMMOND ET AL., SMART CHOICES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MAKING
BETTER DECISIONS 204-05 (1999) (describing experimental evidence of excessive optimism
in quantitative predictions). That risk is smaller, however, if researchers estimating odds are
somehow separated or insulated from decisionmakers'.selecting plans, so that the political
pressures to make optimistic assumptions are reduced.
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excessive optimism."' A standard also demands an explanation, which
may be subject to internal and external scrutiny. That scrutiny has the
potential to highlight excessively optimistic choices, to compensate for
the political pressures demanding optimistic analyses, and to deprive
nontechnical decisionmakers, who might otherwise be blissfully
unaware of the possibility of plan failure, of the opportunity to wash
their hands of choices about planning uncertainty?' Finally, if
estimations of failure probabilities are not distorted, or only slightly
distorted, by political bias, a probability standard checks the ability of
planners to knowingly adopt measures likely to fail."6 If no probability
standard exists, however, that question may never be asked, or may be
confronted only by a select few. The contrast between water and air
quality management is illustrative."7 In the former area, a statutory
margin of safety requirement at least facilitates dialogue, while in the
latter, issues of planning uncertainty may be considered only by a
subset of agency staff."8
A generalized probability standard also creates a metric for post
hoc evaluation, and thus a potential reality check on unjustified
optimism. If a probability standard suggests that agencies should be
highly confident that their plans will succeed, and the agency purports
to be complying with that requirement, yet only fifty percent of the
agency's plans actually do attain statutory goals, the agency has a clear
signal that it is using flawed predictive methods. If no probability
standard exists, however, neither internal nor external observers have
any basis for judging whether the fifty percent failure rate indicates
flaws in the predictive process or simply results from a calculated
decision to weight over- and underregulation exactly equally. Internal
decisionmaking flaws will more likely remain misdiagnosed and
uncorrected.
314. See HOLLING ET AL., supm note 12, at 50 ("[T]he model provides a focus for
communication and a point of departure."); LEE, supra note 32, at 60 ("[S]imply because
putting numbers together in a model requires enough careful thought that relationships that
are logically linked tend to emerge."); supm notes 261-264 and accompanying text
(discussing the inquiries necessitated by the Yucca Mountain probability standards).
315. See HOUCK, supra note 191, at 204 (noting that "objective standards" are
important to facilitate outside review); supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text
(discussing the contrast between NRDC v Muszyd" and Environmental Defense Fund v
EPA).
316. SeeHOUCK, supranote 191, at 204.
317. See supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text.
318. See discussion supm Parts IB, E.
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b. Identifiability and Availability
Ad hoc decisionmaking also is likely to be affected by
"identifiability" or "availability" biases. Those biases also affect
systematic decisionmaking, but there are likely to be differences of
degree, and those differences will often favor legislative or rulemaking
approaches.
The identifiability bias is a tendency to give excessive weight to
interests with which we can emotionally identify and less weight to
interests that, while potentially more important, inspire no such
emotional link."9 The "availability" bias or heuristic is similar; it refers
to a tendency to give more weight to phenomena that are cognitively
"available" or "recallable" than to phenomena that seem remote, and
explains why a person might have more fear of a risk associated with a
powerful narrative, such as a nuclear meltdown, than a risk that seems
more pedestrian.32° Scholars have invoked both to explain all sorts of
tendencies, sometimes in apparently conflicting ways; according to
various accounts, they explain why we have too much environmental
regulation, or too little, or regulation directed to the wrong priorities.21
But there is little doubt that the tendencies do exist."2
Because different information is likely to drive generalized
legislative or rulemaking processes than drive individual project- or
plan-specific decisions, these biases have significant implications for
decisions about forums and processes for making decisions about plan
uncertainty. Once a specific plan is on the table, the bearers of
regulatory burdens are likely to become readily identifiable, and their
stories may seem more compelling than generalized and broadly
shared concerns about environmental quality. The agency offices that
write rules, by contrast, typically are accustomed to using data-set-
319. See generally Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 433 (2008).
320. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 313, at 206-07; Sunstein, supra note 13, at
1041-44.
321. Eg., Hsu, supra note 319, at 436 ("[T]he identifiability effect works a consistent
bias against the cause of environmental protection...."); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1518-20 (1998) (arguing that
availability explains legislative overreactions to relatively minor environmental threats);
Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1041-44 (arguing that the availability heuristic explains the
unjustified appeal of a strict precautionary principle).
322. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heewistic for Judging
Frequency andProbability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163-
78 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (describing experimental evidence).
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driven studies rather than individual anecdotes.3 These distinctions
are muddy; anecdotes about individual circumstances have power in
any sort of process, and adjudicative decisions are rarely made with
complete blinders to broader trends.32' These biases also may cut the
other way; when a specific plan is on the table, its environmental
benefits may be more readily identifiable."5  But much of
environmental law is devoted to producing generalized, long-term,
dispersed gains at the expense of more focused and immediate
regulatory burdens, and those regulatory burdens are likely to assume
greater political force as individual planning choices bring them into
sharper focus. 6
c. Cumulative Misperceptions
Another problem arises from the diversity of sources contributing
to many environmental problems. That diversity creates a potential
collective action problem: the benefits of leniency may accrue
disproportionately to individual agency decisionmakers, while the
benefits of stringency will be more broadly dispersed and can
therefore be easy to ignore.
Many environmental problems arise from the collective effect of
many actions, some of which would individually seem inconse-
quential. Degradation of regional air or water quality and losses of
endangered species habitat often occur incrementally,"7 for example,
and some emerging environmental threats, like increasing greenhouse
gas concentrations, likewise arise from the accumulated consequences
323. See Craig N. Oren, whitman v. American Trucking Associations-The Ghost of
Delegation Revived ... and Exorcised in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 9-26 (Peter L.
Strauss ed., 2006) (describing processes of setting air quality standards); McGARrTY, supra
note 292, at 45-61 (describing the EPA's process of setting the ambient air quality standard for
particulate matter). See generally Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of
Evidence in theAdministrative Process, 55 HARv L. REV. 364, 402-25 (1942).
324. For example, dramatic events like the Cuyahoga River fires and the Santa
Barbara oil spill are widely credited with accelerating environmental law's development. See
e.g., RiCHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 58-59 (2004).
325. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 735 (1994)
(Thomas, J. dissenting) (worrying that parochial environmental concerns will interfere with
broader energy policies).
326. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 154, at 62 ("[F]ocused political pressures ... are
more likely to come from the regulated than from the beneficiaries of regulation."); John M.
Volkman & Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, the
Endangered Species Act, and Adaptive Management, 23 ENvTL. L. 1249, 1263 (1993)
("Often, the short-term economic benefits of development are obvious, while the benefits of
environmental recovery are easy to discount.").
327. See Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.YU.
L. REv. 115, 196-97 (2004); Houck, supra note 191, at 4-5.
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of many smaller actions. 8  If decisionmakers ignore individual
actions' contributions to such larger problems, the larger problems are
likely to remain unsolved. Yet ignoring these small contributions is
often easy, for the link to the larger problem may seem less immediate
and less apparent than the localized consequences. Even if a regulator
knows a species is threatened by a local development approval, she
may easily rationalize putting a few local animals at risk, forgetting
that elsewhere planners may be thinking in similar ways and that the
collective consequence may be extinction. 9  The normal human
tendency to view one's own behavior in an excessively positive light,
and therefore underestimate contributions to shared problems, is likely
to exacerbate that effect.3 In combination, these tendencies can lead
people to mentally isolate local choices from larger environmental
problems.
Those distortions can change outcomes, for often the extent of
many environmental problems is controlled by multiple planning
choices. Multiple consultation or permitting decisions, for example,
can collectively determine the fate of an endangered species, and while
the degradation allowed in each permitting decision may seem minor
when viewed independently, the collective effect may be a significant
reduction in species habitat.' Regional air quality may depend upon
multiple SIP amendments.3 If nuclear energy use continues, future
radiation levels will likely depend upon multiple permitting processes
like that currently underway for Yucca Mountain.3 Not all planning
decisions create this threat; if the geographic and temporal scale of a
plan matches the geographic and temporal scale of an environmental
problem, then the plan can serve as a mechanism for comprehensively
addressing contributing sources, and can be an antidote rather than a
328. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538
E3d 1172, 1215-17 (9th Cir. 2008).
329. See Shilling, supm note 132, at 1662 ("Even when recovery plans have been
developed, goals have often been set below the existing population size at the time of listing,
a strategy that has provoked the admonition that species are being 'managed for
extinction."').
330. SeeThompson, supra note 308, at 260-61 (summarizing research demonstrating a
tendency to underestimate one's own contribution to resource degradation).
331. See Rohlf, supra note 140, at 115 ("The Services commonly approve project after
project that have significant impacts on threatened and endangered species and their habitats,
pushing these organisms incrementally closer to extinction."); Shilling, supra note 132, at
1662 ("The cumulative effect of [the HCP] process across the landscape on survival of
endangered species has not been adequately addressed ... ").
332. Air quality in East Coast states, for example, depends not only on in-state plans
but also on upwind states' emissions.
333. SeeTHEKEYSTONECTR., supranote 248, at 72.
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contributor to misunderstanding of cumulative impacts. But many
plans have scopes smaller or temporally shorter than the scale of the
underlying problem.
In those situations, ad hoc decisionmaking is more likely than
systematic approaches to produce lax approaches to plan uncertainty.
Systematic approaches tend to be driven to a somewhat greater extent
by collective consequences; when the EPA develops national air
quality standards, for example, its focus is somewhat more likely to be
the desired national outcome, rather than regulatory costs unique to a
specific company or individual."' And when one focuses on those
broader consequences, and thus is considering the collective effect of
many plans, some percentage of which are likely to fail, it is harder to
write off chronic high failure risk on the assumption that some other
plan will pick up the slack.335 Additionally, even if local planners
realize their plan's potential contribution to a larger problem, they may
gain little, in the absence of a generalized probability standard, from
taking steps to limit that contribution.336 The political penalties of
adopting a stringent plan will accrue disproportionately and
immediately to those specific planners, while the benefits will likely
be more temporally or spatially dispersed, and may prove negligible if
other planning offices are unwilling to face similar controversy.337
With each decision, planners therefore have incentives to plan
leniently, creating local benefits while courting failure risks that others
in different places or at different times will share. A systematic
standard, by contrast, provides an opportunity for a collectively
developed, mutually coercive solution to this collective action problem.
334. For case studies of the EPA's process of setting air quality standards, see
MCGARITY, supra note 292, at 45-6 1; Oren, supra note 323.
335. EPA's final safety standard for Yucca Mountain exemplifies this danger.
Traditional nuclear safety standards adhere to an "apportionment" principle, which requires
site-specific standards to be sufficiently low to allow for radiation from other sources.
TECHNICAL BASES, supra note 220, at 40-41. In its Yucca Mountain standard, however, the
EPA disregarded the need for other sources and decided to allocate the entire standard to
Yucca Mountain alone. See Public Health and Environmental Protection Radiation Standards
for Yucca Mountain, N, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,256, 61,266 (Oct. 15, 2008) (to be codified at 40
C.ER. pt. 197).
336. See generally William W Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A
Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IowA L. REv 1, 32-33 (2003) (discussing collective action
problems leading to underregulation).
337. Even if the same planners will reap the short-term benefits and long-term costs of
leniency, human psychology still can create distorting effects. "Bounded willpower" and
"hyperbolic discounting" can still lead planners to favor short-term conflict avoidance. See
generallyJolls et al., supra note 321, at 1479, 1539.
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d. Agency Competence and Culture
The foregoing discussion suggests several reasons why ad hoc
decisions will tend to produce more risk-tolerant outcomes. However,
other factors can complicate the analysis. Most importantly, ad hoc
decisionmaking can relocate responsibilities from Congress to
agencies, from agencies' political appointees to their career staff, or
from one internal agency office to another. Sometimes, in spite of the
tendencies described above, those shifts may produce more cautious
decisions.
Most government agencies are culturally heterogeneous. Political
appointees in management positions, whose goals are likely to reflect
the priorities of the current administration, may emphasize different
goals than agency staff, who may have joined the agency partly
because of a sense of identification with its traditional mission.
Among agency staff, different professional backgrounds may lead to
different priorities."9 Even among similarly situated administrative
bodies, differences in staffing, tradition, or individual personalities
may lead to disparate approaches. Different fishery management
councils, for example, have taken markedly disparate approaches to
fishery regulation.34 °
Because of those heterogeneities, any categorical assertion about
the effects of displacing ad hoc decisionmaking with systematic
rulemaking processes will be at least partly wrong. Sometimes such
relocation will produce more protective outcomes, but not always; it
depends on the perspective of the involved appointees and staff, and
the extent to which technical staff are insulated from, or resistant to,
pressure from regulated groups. Likewise, sometimes creating
specific probability standards will empower agency staff interested in
furthering the agency's environmental protection mission, for those
standards will provide staff with a bulwark against outside pressure,4
but, again, not always. While there are reasons to expect that
substituting more systematic decisionmaking approaches for the
338. Internal disputes within the Bush Administration have repeatedly revealed this
trend. See, e.g., James Gerstenzang & Janet Wilson, White House Puts Warming Threats on
BACKBURNER, L.A. TIMEs, July 12, 2008, atAl.
339. See, e.g., MCGARrrY, supra note 292, at 6-16 (describing differences between
"program office" and "policy office" cultures). This disparity can be particularly salient
where multiple agencies work on the same problem.
340. EAGLE ETAL., supra note 55, at 19 (describing the North Pacific Council).
341. For example, in one interview, EPA staff told me they would have a hard time
demanding significant margins of error in SIPs without some guidance or regulation to cite
as authority. Telephone Interview with Doris Lo & Sarvy Mahdavi, supra note 108.
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present ad hoc approach will often produce more cautious
decisionmaking, other contextual factors ensure the existence of some
exceptions.
B. The Benefits ofIigh Probability Standards
Even if ad hoc decisions will often produce lenient probability
standards, that raises another question: is there anything wrong with
such lax standards? Some plausible justifications for lax approaches
are readily apparent, for high assurance levels are not cost free. To
require an eighty percent chance of plan success means requiring that
nearly eighty percent of plans impose more regulatory constraint than
will turn out, in hindsight, to be necessary to achieve the statutory
goal. Such additional protection can create social and economic costs,
and for that reason, many environmental decisionmakers strive to
avoid providing more environmental protection than necessary."2 In
taking this approach, they are encouraged by regulated parties willing
to use politics and litigation to protest perceived overregulation, by a
judiciary often hostile to regulatory governancef 3 and, sometimes, by
legal-academic skepticism of the wisdom of environmental law's
constraints.' A crucial premise-sometimes implicit and, in some
influential scholarship, sometimes stated fairly clearly-of much of
this opposition is that overregulation is every bit as problematic as
underregulation, and that both should be equally disfavored. "5 Given
such a framing, a moderately lenient plan uncertainty standard, like the
fifty-one percent chance standard adopted in Daley, might seem not
just tolerable, but optimal. Nevertheless, as I explain below, there are
significant problems with this view, even if one is agnostic about
whether standards for environmental outcomes are overprotective or
underprotective.
A system that errs toward underprotective plans is inherently
unstable."46 If a plan fails to achieve the statutory goal, replacement
342. See, e.g., Dave Owen, Law, EnvironmentalDynamism, Reliability: The Rise and
Fall of CALFED, 37 ENvTL. L. 1145, 1154-55 (2007); Rohlf, supm note 140, at 141-42
(describing the Department of the Interior's policy of allocating the "cushion" to endangered
species-impacting projects up to the point ofjeopardy).
343. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossificaton of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfelg 75 TEx. L. REv. 525, 530 (1997).
344. See Buzbee, supm note 336, at 4, 38-44 ("Theories of overregulation abound.").
345. See, e.g, Ackerman & Stewart, supm note 41, at 1333-40; Cass R. Sunstein,
Adm'strative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627-31. Both articles describe regulatory
approaches that produce more protection than necessary to attain compliance as
inappropriately inefficient.
346. SeegenerallyOwen, supra note 342.
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will probably be a legal necessity." The replacement process will
likely be burdensome; environmental planning processes often last
years and require thousands of hours of time.348 It also can be
personally and politically costly, for a series of plan failures can
exacerbate frustrations among agency staff and distrust among
stakeholders .1 9  Failure also creates an unpredictable climate for
regulated entities, for each new plan is likely to intensify regulatory
constraints, undermining private investments made in reliance on the
original planning scheme. That same dynamic can ossify plans, even
if change is environmentally necessary; regulated groups are likely to
resist changes if they already have made accommodations they thought
were sufficient to achieve compliance."' Consequently, when more
protective plans finally do go into effect, all room for regulatory
flexibility may have disappeared, and the new constraints may be
drastic. 5' They may also be permanent; because of persistent plan
failures, some industries, like logging in the Pacific Northwest or cod
fishing in the Northeast, may never again approach their former scale.
A regulatory process marked by a high risk of plan failure, in short,
will lead to pervasive governmental dysfunction, and the economic or
political benefits of developing more lenient plans may be ephemeral
and unreliable.
Less instability, if any, should result from erring toward additional
protection. Notwithstanding the strong preferences of many regulated
entities, there generally is nothing illegal about regulatory limitations
that turn out, in hindsight, to be more cautious than necessary."2 No
law, for example, outlaws plans that produce air slightly cleaner than
the NAAQS or species abundance exceeding the goals of the ESA.
347. Not all plan failures necessitate new plans, of course. Even if mitigation
measures used to facilitate NEPA compliance fail to fulfill the statutory goal, no consequence
is likely, and some plan failures-for example, those associated with nuclear waste
disposal-may not be correctable at all. See discussion supra Parts II.C-D.
348. See, e.g., Fine & Owen, supra note 30, at 949-58 (describing the process of
preparing a SIP).
349. E.g., Owen, supra note 342, at 1149-52, 1204 (describing the loss of agency
credibility and increasing litigation resulting from the failure of the CALFED plan).
350. See generally Buzbee, supra note 336, at 33-35 (explaining incentives for
preserving regulatory status quos).
351. See, e.g., EAGLE ETAL., supra note 55, at 19 (describing a complete closure of the
Pacific rockfish fishery); Doremus, supra note 154, at 59-60 (describing the consequences of
failed measures to protect the Northern Spotted Owl); Houck, supra note 71, at 946-47
(describing severe declines in fishery populations and their economic consequences); Owen,
supra note 342, at 1202-03 (describing "drastic measures" imposed as the CALFED plan
collapsed).
352. SeeOwen, supranote 342, at 1154-55, 1160-61.
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While regulated parties may prefer the least constraining regulatory
scheme that might work, few statutes demand that those preferences be
fulfilled.353 A plan that provides more environmental benefit than turns
out, in hindsight, to be necessary therefore does need not be replaced,
and if it is replaced or updated, the changes will likely occur at the
convenience of the agency, not under the pressure of a judicial
injunction."' Private parties may be somewhat more constrained than
they would prefer, but their constraints at least will be stable."
In addition to being a means to stable regulatory schemes,
environmentally protective probability standards serve another
important goal: legal compliance is an important end in itself. We
value lawful conduct as an independent good-as the foundation of
societal stability and as an indication of respect for the social contracts
and legislative choices of a democratic society-not just as a means to
promote the correct balance of economic and environmental harms.
Plan failure therefore is not a problem just because legal
noncompliance is inconvenient, but also because noncompliance
undermines our governance system. The fact that plan failure
produces unlawful outcomes therefore ought to weigh against planning
systems with high failure risk.
None of the foregoing discussion means that certainty of success
should be the usual standard. Demanding certainty may compel plans
that prevent regulated entities from acting at all. 56 If the regulated
activity produces societal benefits, and reasonable alternative ways of
producing those benefits do not exist, such an absolute prohibition
makes little sense. A one-size-fits-all standard also is not appropriate,
for some of the factors that should influence probability standards will
vary by context." ' But there are fundamental problems with a system
353. The Toxic Substances Control Act, which requires EPA to regulate "to the extent
necessary to protect adequately against such risk using the least burdensome requirements,"
might be the rare exception to this general rule, but even that language should allow agencies
some discretion where EPA is not certain how much protection will be adequate. See 15
U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
354. See generally Dave Owen, Legal Constraints, Environmental Variability and the
Limits of Innovative Environmental Governance, ENVTL. SCi. & PoL'v (2008) (describing the
injunctions that effectively ended the CALFED program).
355. See Owen, supa note 342, at 1162-66.
356. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1004. Sometimes prohibiting all activity is
appropriate; if the benefits produced by the regulated activity are minimal or the potential
costs of noncompliance are exceedingly high, a prohibitively strict probability standard
makes sense.
357. For example, a lower probability standard may make sense where the cumulative
effects of errors of over- and underprotection are likely to cancel out, where particularly
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in which plans with a coin toss chance of success, or worse, are
generally deemed legally adequate, for such an approach amounts to
systemic indulgence of legal noncompliance and regulatory
dysfunction. Agencies ought to be more confident that their plans will
work.
C ExAnte, Ex Post, and the Choice ofRefornmApproaches
This Article has argued that problems of planning uncertainty
pervade environmental law and that existing approaches to those
problems are flawed. A skeptic might concede those points yet wonder
if the proposed reforms offer a somewhat pass6 fix. Those reforms
would increase the centralization of agency decisionmaking, and they
also focus on improving predictive decisionmaking. That approach
might appear to fall on the wrong side of some of the key dichotomies
that environmental law scholars have set up over the last twenty years,
particularly in much of the literature addressing adaptive
management "8 and some related work more broadly addressing "new
governance" theories."' That literature also emphasizes the
uncertainties inherent in environmental management. But the
common response has been skepticism of ex ante predictions and
centralized approaches and a preference for monitoring and adjustment
mechanisms designed to correct problems once they occur.' I
therefore close by explaining why the reforms I propose have merit.
robust measures for correcting plan failures exist, or where the costs of even moderate levels
of excess protection are completely disproportionate to the benefits.
358. "Adaptive management" has taken on a range of meanings, and agency managers
implementing "adaptive" approaches are sometimes doing things that the original academic
proponents of adaptive management would probably condemn. See Doremus, supra note
154, at 52-53 ("Beyond the most general level, however, there is no consensus on what
adaptive management requires."); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarhy and Adaptive Change:
Around the Loop and BackAgain, 7 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 59, 69-73 (2005).
359. See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 46, at 286-88 (advocating both adaptive
learning and decentralized decisionmaking, in which "[t]he chief role of Congress ... would
be to authorize and finance experimental reform by states and other subnational
jurisdictions"). For a summary discussion of this literature, see Annecoos Wiersema, A Train
Without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural
ResourcesLaw, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1241-43 (2008).
360. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 168, at 907-08 (arguing for a shift "from the
uncertain and speculative realm of comprehensive ex ante prediction to the pragmatic
empiricism of observation, measurement, and verification," which will "situate
decisionmaking on a firmer pragmatic and empirically grounded footing"); J.B. Ruhl, Taking
Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act 52 U. KAN.




The movement toward adaptive management grew out of the
realization, first articulated by ecologists"' and then widely adopted by
many other environmental scholars, that all environmental policies are
necessarily experimental.6 Because of environmental uncertainties,
human uncertainties, and complex system dynamics and feedback
loops, scholars have widely concluded that no matter how hard we try
to improve our predictive capacities, all environmental policies amount
to tentative hypotheses.3 Drawing upon those insights, commentators
have proposed that environmental managers should devote more
attention to ongoing monitoring, that environmental decisionmakers
should build flexibility into institutional structures, and that policies
should be treated as tentative and subject to adjustment.36"
So far, little contradiction should appear between these principles
and the reforms I have advocated. Nothing in this Article undercuts
arguments for postdecisional monitoring and adjustment. A
probability standard would not eliminate plan failures; we need
probability standards precisely because some predictive errors are
unavoidable. Indeed, the errors will come in layers. The same
uncertainties that prevent environmental managers from predicting
outcomes with certainty also often preclude precise and accurate
assessment of the odds of outcomes."6 Probability standards therefore
will not preclude unexpected outcomes, and monitoring and adaptation
will remain important. A well designed probability standard also
ought to help adaptive management succeed. The point of a
probability standard is to reduce the frequency and extent of required
adjustments; even if all policies represent hypotheses, a probability
standard should help make those hypotheses, in the aggregate, more
accurate. The consequence should be to make adaptation more
361. See generally HOLUNG ET AL., supm note 12.
362. For good summaries of the evolution of adaptive management ideas, see Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults.- Toward
a Bounded Pmgmatism, 87 MINN. L. REv. 943, 948-56 (2003), and Angelo, supra note 29, at
1546-62.
363. See LEE, supm note 32, at 9 ("[P]olicies are experiments; learn from them.");
Karkkainen, supm note 358, at 59-60.
364. See, e.g., FARBER, supm note 29, at 179-98; HOLLNG Er AL., supra note 12, at
133, 136-37; LEE, supra note 32, at 138-39; Karkkainen, supra note 168, at 45-46; A. Dan
Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2003); Wiersema, supra note 359, at 1250. These sources
represent a limited sampling; the adaptive management literature is extensive.
365. For that reason, I would not suggest that any court should ever reject an agency's
attempt to comply with a probability standard just because the agency has candidly admitted
that its estimates of probabilities are subject to significant uncertainty.
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feasible, for smaller and less frequent adaptive changes ought to be
easier to implement.
3 6
Some of the adaptive management literature, however, seems to
imply not just that back-end corrective measures will be necessary, but
also that centralized efforts to improve ex ante decisionmaking are
misguided.167  And some agency efforts at implementing adaptive
management seem to reflect a disdain for ex ante attempts to avoid
plan failure; agencies, particularly when implementing the ESA, have
sometimes adopted highly optimistic approaches to plan uncertainty,
apparently discounting ex ante caution because future adaptations
hopefully will correct any problems that occur.368 These trends spring
from different roots-many of the academic critics are concerned with
the tendency of predictions to be speculative, malleable, and falsely
precise, while the agencies sometimes seem more concerned with
"using the promise of adaptive management to avoid politically tough
decisions" 7 -but the endpoint is the same.
But while healthy skepticism about predictive capacities is
appropriate, discounting any possibility for front-end reform is
problematic. Initially, one asserted basis for this skepticism-the view
that environmental planners cannot predict the future at all, so there is
little sense trying-overstates the case. 7' Environmental managers do
have some real expertise, and the enormous collective effort devoted to
understanding environmental systems and developing simulation tools
does allow some predictions to be made with confidence. 2 Even
where multiple uncertainties affect predictions, planners can often rely
on statistical techniques and experienced-based judgment to estimate
366. See geneMly Owen, supra note 354 (explaining traditional obstacles to
implementing adaptive management).
367. PILKEY & PILKEY-JARVIS, supra note 285, at 63 (advocating "adaptive staging" as
an alternative to predictive approaches); Ruhl, supra note 306, at 35 (describing
"predecisional activity" as counterproductive "foreplay"); see sources cited supra note 360.
368. See Camacho, supra note 126, at 331 (describing FWS and NMFS' use of
adaptive management "in HCPs that otherwise would not qualify for an ITP because the risk
to the species of granting the permit is too high"); Doremus, supra note 154, at 69-77
(describing adaptive management in ESA implementation); Owen, supra note 354, at 3
(describing the approach taken by the CALFED program).
369. See, e.g., PILKEY & PILKEY-JARVIS, supra note 285, at 19-20. Many of those
criticisms derive from experiences with cost-benefit analyses and risk assessment. See, e.g.,
FARBER, supra note 29, at 165-69 (describing some of the challenges of risk assessment and
cost-benefit analysis).
370. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 73.
371. See PiLKEY & PiLKEY-JARVis, supra note 285, at 204.
372. See, e.g., WORKING GROUP 1 OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12-17 (2007) (predicting the likelihood of future
outcomes); HOLLING ETAL., supra note 12, at 6 (explaining the value of ecological models).
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uncertainties and consider their implications. 73 Obviously significant
uncertainties remain, sometimes recognized and sometimes not, and
models can either be manipulated or simply indeterminate.7' But there
also are plenty of circumstances--climate change modeling is an
important example-where predictive methods have proven
indispensible.3" To suggest that environmental planners are simply
blind to the future, and cannot improve their plans' odds of success, is
much too pessimistic.
Additionally, as flawed as predictive approaches may be, there is
no choice but to use them because postdecisional adaptive
management usually offers only a limited cure. 6  In many
circumstances, the costs of meaningful adaptation will be prohibitive;
adjusting a major infrastructure project may be impossible. Even
where it is theoretically possible, adaptive management requires a lot
of information, but most environmental agencies have limited
resources available for research and monitoring.377  Against a
background of natural variation and multiple potential causes,
attributing environmental outcomes to particular causes can require
long-term studies, and there also may be significant lags between the
time when adjustment must occur, if the program is to be successful,
and the availability of sufficient data to justify a course correction."'
Ongoing adjustment also may be institutionally and psychologically
challenging, for people in general and governmental institutions in
particular are not typically predisposed to midcourse correction or
skeptical self-examination.3 9
373. See generally Poulter, supra note 237 (describing Monte Carlo and sensitivity
analyses).
374. See, e.g., PILKEY & PILKEY-JARVIS, supra note 285 (chronicling inaccurate
predictions).
375. See Daniel A. Farber, Modeling Climate Change and Its Impacts.: Law, Policy,
and Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1655, 1658-67 (2008).
376. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 51-52 ("Adaptive management is essential to the
ultimate success of this new age of environmental restoration. But it runs counter to human
nature and the current structure of our management institutions."); volkman & McConnaha,
supra note 326, at 1261-62 (describing multiple challenges); Owen, supra note 354, at 3
(describing challenges in context of CALFED).
377. See Doremus, supra note 133, at 417-19.
378. See, e.g., Wiersema, supra note 359, at 1278-79 (discussing how Chesapeake Bay
managers were pressured to respond to short-term data on crab populations before they had
sufficient time to determine what those data meant).
379. See HAMMOND ETAL., supra note 313, at 193-200 (1999) (describing how status
quo biases, sunk costs, and tendencies to overvalue confirming evidence tend to skew
decisions); McGARrrY, supra note 292, at 137 (quoting an EPA analyst who asserted, "How is
my career going to be advanced by doing a study that shows that three years ago the agency
made a wrong prediction? It is not in my best interest." (internal quotation marks omitted));
2009] 333
TULANE LA W REVIEW
Adaptive management also can marginalize participants who
otherwise might effectively advocate for such corrections. Adaptive
decisionmaking necessarily means temporally diffuse decisionmaking;
continuing adjustment requires multiple decision points. That
diffusion limits participation by stakeholders, like political leaders or
environmental nonprofit groups, with limited time or financial
resources.380  But the leverage exerted by those outsiders is often
crucial to the success of any environmental program, because their
advocacy is often the necessary prerequisite to agencies taking
environmentally protective steps, or, more fundamentally, to moving
those agencies beyond familiar, comfortable habits that happen to be
incompatible with the mandates of environmental laws. 8' The record
of adaptive management programs suggests that these theoretical
concerns have ample bases in reality. From endangered species
protection to ecosystem restoration, stories of adaptive management
gone wrong, or gone nowhere, abound. 2
To say that adaptive management approaches face significant
challenges is not to say that adaptive management should not be
attempted. An approach entirely predicated on predictive decisions,
with little follow-up monitoring or potential for monitoring, offers a
nearly blank check to wishful thinking. Nor are all adaptive
management programs equally limited; there may be ways to construct
more successful adaptive programs.383 But environmental managers
Doremus, supra note 154, at 55-56 ("Decisionmakers are likely to see equivocal evidence as
confirming their preexisting management biases").
380. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 81 ("The increasing decentralization of ESA
decisionmaking, particularly through the HCP process, makes it even more difficult for these
diffuse interests to play an effective role."); discussion supra notes 300-303 and
accompanying text.
381. Many major environmental reform efforts begin with nonprofit groups' lawsuits.
See Doremus, supra note 154, at 65-66 (describing the importance of citizen suits to ESA
implementation); Owen, supra note 354, at 2 (describing the outset of the CALFED process).
See generally Charles F Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public
Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015, 1020 (2004) (describing the potential for
litigation "to destabilize the parties' pre-litigation expectations through political, cognitive,
and psychological effects that widen the possibilities of experimentalist collaboration").
382. Camacho, supra note 126, at 324-44; Karkkainen, supra note 358, at 61 ("Even
the most well-funded and technically sophisticated ecosystem management efforts ... are
still struggling, often awkwardly and uncertainly, to integrate adaptive management
principles.").
383. See Doremus, supra note 154, at 81-86 (explaining the importance of
transparency, public participation, and insulation from project-specific pressures);
Karkkainen, supra note 362, at 948-56 (suggesting combining adaptive management
approaches with penalty default systems); Owen, supra note 354, at 5 (arguing that




and legal theorists ought to retain a healthy awareness of the
limitations of adaptive management programs, which are likely to
struggle whenever asked to produce significant adjustment in a timely
manner." Initial decisions are still crucially important, and even if
perfecting predictions is impossible, striving to proactively manage
error remains a worthwhile goal.
IV CONCLUSION
In recent decades, much of environmental law scholarship has
considered the challenges of achieving environmental improvements in
contexts of uncertainty. We understand now, to a much greater extent
than we did when Congress drafted most major environmental statutes,
that uncertainty pervades environmental policy and that addressing
those uncertainties is imperative if our legal approaches are to
succeed.85 But identifying that broader problem still leaves difficult
questions to be resolved: how exactly does our traditional
environmental system fail to address these uncertainties, and how
might we address such failings?
This Article has identified an important way in which our
existing environmental laws poorly address those uncertainties.
Despite the near ubiquity of systems that establish legal standards and
require plans to achieve those standards, and despite the fact that
planners are almost always uncertain about whether their plans will
succeed, existing statutes and regulations create only a patchwork
response to uncertainties about plan success. That patchwork is not
uniformly problematic; in some contexts, meaningful guidance exists.
But in general, most statutes and regulations leave the development of
probability standards to ad hoc, nontransparent decisionmaking
processes and allow widespread indulgence of plan failure. Neither
tendency is desirable, and both can be reformed. By promoting more
systematic and transparent confrontations with the uncertainties
inherent in environmental planning, and by requiring somewhat more
cautious approaches to management of those uncertainties, probability
standards could reduce the persistent gaps between written
environmental standards and actual performance.
384. See Owen, supra note 354, at 6-7 (describing struggle in the context of
CALFED).
385. See discussion supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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